Essays on the governance of buyer-supplier relationships by Berger, Johannes
  
 University of Groningen
Essays on the governance of buyer-supplier relationships
Berger, Johannes
IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from
it. Please check the document version below.
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Publication date:
2015
Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database
Citation for published version (APA):
Berger, J. (2015). Essays on the governance of buyer-supplier relationships. Groningen: University of
Groningen, SOM research school.
Copyright
Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the
author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).
Take-down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons the
number of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum.
Download date: 12-11-2019
Chapter 4
INTERFIRM ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY: ITS 
DIMENSIONS, DRIVERS, AND IMPACT ON 
AMBIDEXTERITY1
4.1 INTRODUCTION
In the past two decades knowledge gained acceptance as one of the most important 
determinants of competitive advantage (e.g., Grant, 1996; Eisenhardt, and Santos, 2002). 
Knowledge-based resources are often tacit, sticky and difficult to codify and therefore 
difficult to imitate (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Dyer and Singh, 1998; Jap, 1999). As a 
consequence, firms that are effective in developing and transferring knowledge-based 
resources are likely to achieve competitive advantages over competitors who are not 
(Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991). From a firm perspective, R&D investments and prior 
experience are considered to be the main contributors to the capability to create and 
exploit knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). There are, however, limits to the firm’s 
ability to acquire knowledge and to capture value from it. When knowledge is shared or 
transferred between firms, the individual firms can gain access to each other’s knowledge-
based resources and capture value from both firms’ perspectives (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998; 
Dyer and Singh, 1998; Lane, Salk, and Lyles, 2001; Uzzi and Lancaster, 2003; Palmatier, 
Dant, and Grewal, 2007). Also from innovation theory we know that interorganizational 
networks and interfirm relationships play an important role in innovation activities (e.g., 
Lane and Lubatkin, 1998; Rindfleish and Moorman, 2001; Von Hippel and Katz, 2002; 
Malhotra, Gosain, and El Sawy, 2005). As such, it can be rewarding for a firm to expand its 
knowledge scope beyond its boundaries, because learning will be fostered not only by the 
firm’s internal capabilities, but also by the firm’s ties with the outside world (e.g., Dyer and 
Singh, 1998; Jap, 1999; Uzzi and Lancaster, 2003; Volberda, Foss, and Lyles, 2010). 
In this study we take the outside perspective and empirically investigate the absorptive 
capacity (ACAP) of vertical interfirm relationships. More specifically we empirically 
investigate the interactions between buyer and supplier in their dyadic relationships. In 
the previous chapters we conceived the buyer-supplier relationship from a transaction 
1  Berger, J., and Leeflang, P.S.H. 2015. Interfirm absorptive capacity: Its drivers, dimensions, and impact 
on ambidexterity. SOM-series working paper, University of Groningen.  
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cost economics (TCE) perspective and emphasized the effect of asset specificity and 
governance modes (amongst others) on perceived dependence (Chapter 2), and the size 
and probability of loss (Chapter 3). In this study we investigate whether and how asset 
specificity and governance modes (amongst others) contribute to the learning capabilities 
of the relationship, mainly from a resource-based view (RBV) perspective. Accordingly, 
we shift our orientation from basically transaction cost minimizing considerations (TCE) 
to joint value creation (RBV). Conceptually we explicitly separate between horizontal 
(e.g., joint ventures) and vertical interfirm relationships (firms operating at successive 
stages in the production chain), since both alliance forms show different cooperative 
interfirm behaviors, due to differences in structure and motivation (Park and Russo, 1996; 
Achrol, 1997), which lead in their turn to differences in the way knowledge is acquired 
and exploited (Rindfleisch and Moorman, 2001).
The aim of our study is to advance the understanding of interfirm ACAP, its underlying 
dimensions, its  drivers, and its impact on ambidexterity. The role of ACAP has widely 
been identified as the most significant determinant of knowledge transfer (Lane, Koka, 
and Pathak, 2006; Volberda et al., 2010). Zahra and George (2002) have conceptualized 
ACAP as a bundle of four distinct, yet complementary knowledge-based capabilities aimed 
at acquiring, assimilating, transforming and exploiting external knowledge. Potential 
absorptive capacity (PACAP) contains the two first mentioned capabilities of acquisition 
and assimilation, and corresponds to explorative learning. Realized absorptive capacity 
(RACAP) contains the two last mentioned capabilities of transformation and exploitation, 
and corresponds to exploitative learning. Whereas explorative learning involves adding 
new resources and competences, exploitative learning is primarily used to further refine 
existing competences (e.g., March, 1991). 
We take into consideration the dynamics of present markets. To enhance long-term 
competitiveness, it is necessary to foster explorative learning and exploitative learning 
simultaneously (e.g., Zahra and George, 2002; Benner and Tushman, 2003; Gibson and 
Birkinshaw, 2004). This offers “paradoxical challenges”, since both learning types require 
“fundamentally different and inconsistent architectures and competencies” (Jansen, 
Tempelaar, Van den Bosch, and Volberda, 2009: 797). As a consequence, we have to take 
seriously the multidimensional nature of the ACAP construct in trying to understand 
both the antecedent conditions of the construct and in its impact on ambidexterity.  As 
a measure of ambidexterity we will use indicators that are linked to the explorative and 
exploitative learning performance of the relationship, where we define ambidexterity 
as the ability of the relationship to simultaneously explore and exploit (O’Reilly and 
Tushman, 2008). 
The contribution of our study to the literature is fourfold. First, our study is the first 
which considers the ACAP construct from the interfirm level, while explicitly taking 
its multidimensionality into account. Although numerous studies acknowledge the 
importance of the ACAP construct (e.g., Zahra and George, 2002; Lane et al., 2006; 
Volberda et al., 2010), only one study has empirically captured ACAP’s multidimensionality 
and measured the construct directly. Jansen, Van den Bosch, and Volberda (2005) 
have investigated the relationship between organizational antecedents and the ACAP 
dimensions from an intrafirm level perspective.  So far, interfirm-level empirical work 
has focused on the interorganizational antecedents of learning without measuring ACAP 
directly (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998; Jap, 1999; Kale, Singh, and Perlmutter, 2000; Lane et 
al., 2001), or by only taking a part of the ACAP construct into consideration (Selnes and 
Sallis, 2003; Johnson, Sohi, and Grewal, 2004). 
Second, we bring the ambidexterity debate to the interfirm level, arguing that successful 
interfirm relationships need to be efficient in their dealings with today’s environment, 
while being prepared for tomorrow’s changes (March, 1991, Benner and Tushman, 2003; 
Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004).2 We relate interfirm PACAP and RACAP to contextual 
ambidexterity; we do so by conceiving interfirm ACAP as a dynamic capability (Zahra 
and George, 2002), that offers the behavioral capacity to simultaneously demonstrate 
alignment and adaptability across the entire relationship (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004).
Third, we critically investigate the relevance of the determinants of relational rents as 
advocated by the resource-based view (RBV). RBV has been portrayed as the kernel of 
a unifying paradigm when applied to interfirm relationships (Palmatier et al., 2007). 
From a RBV-based point of view, Dyer and Singh (1998) have proposed that interfirm 
relationships will generate competitive advantages only as they move away from the 
attributes of an arm’s-length relationship. As a consequence, (1) relation-specific assets, 
(2) knowledge-sharing routines, (3) complementary resources and capabilities, and (4) 
effective governance are proposed to be the determinants of relational rents. Dyer and 
Singh consider partner-specific  ACAP to be “a function of the extent to which partners 
have developed overlapping knowledge bases and the extent to which partners have 
developed interaction routines to maximize the frequency and intensity of sociotechnical 
interactions.” (1998: 665). From our dyadic perspective this statement is correct, but 
incomplete. Since not the individual firm, but the interfirm relationship is the unit of 
analysis of our study, we extend Dyer and Singh’s statement and claim that interfirm 
ACAP is a function of all four determinants of relational rents. 
Fourth, we investigate whether  buyers and suppliers share the same perception of the 
relationship, and whether from the buyers’ and suppliers’ perspective the drivers affecting 
the relationship’s learning capabilities are the same in sign and size. To that purpose we 
examine matched-pair relationships, and gather dyadic responses from both sides of the 
relationship. Literature reveals that buyers and suppliers may not share the same perceptions 
of their relationships (John and Reve, 1982; Buchanon, 1992; Barnes, Naudé, and Michell, 
2007; Ambrose, Marshall, and Lynch, 2010; Oosterhuis, Molleman, and Van der Vaart, 2012). 
2  The concept of ambidexterity also has been applied  in other contexts, such as the manager’s ambidexterity 
(e.g., Keller and Weibler, 2014) and the firm’s ambidexterity (e.g., Jansen et al., 2009).
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This implies that if buyers and suppliers perceive attributes of their relationship differently, 
the associations between these attributes may differ as well (e.g., Oosterhuis et al., 2012). 
In the following sections we propose that the complementarity between both partners 
provides the potential for explorative and exploitative interfirm learning, but it is the 
quality of the complementary relationship that enables the realization of this potential. 
Hence we develop and empirically test a model in which complementarity is considered 
the antecedent of interfirm ACAP. We hypothesize that compatibility, connectedness, 
idiosyncratic investments, contracting and relational norms are the generative 
mechanisms that mediate the relationship between knowledge complementarity and 
interfirm ACAP. We make a distinction between PACAP and RACAP and subsequently 
link both dimensions to ambidexterity. Data are obtained from 166 matched-pair buyer-
supplier relationships. Our analysis reveals that both from the buyer perspective and the 
supplier perspective complementarity is positively related to PACAP and RACAP, and to a 
large degree mediated by the (remaining) determinants of relational rents. Furthermore it 
shows that from both perspectives PACAP and RACAP are highly linked to ambidexterity. 
We conclude by discussing the scientific and managerial implications of our findings, the 
limitations of our research and the directions for future research.  
Below we first discuss the most important concepts that constitute the basis of our study. 
This is followed by the construction of a formal conceptual model. Based on data from 166 
matched-pairs of buyers and suppliers we tested the model empirically, applying PLS-SEM 
path modeling for both sides of the relationship separately.
4.2 AMBIDEXTERITY, ACAP’S DYNAMIC CAPABILITIES, AND  
 RBV’S RELATIONAL VIEW
Three central topics need some further theoretical elaboration before we start to specify 
our conceptual model and hypotheses. First the concept of ambidexterity will be further 
explained. Ambidexterity stands for the firm’s ability to simultaneously explore and 
exploit. Since both learning types require different and inconsistent architectures and 
competencies, firms have to find a way to balance the conflicting tensions between 
exploration and exploitation to be successful. Second, we further elaborate on Zahra and 
George’s (2002) conceptualization of ACAP. They conceptualized ACAP as a dynamic 
capability, and dynamic capabilities are required  to be ambidextrous. Third, the ‘RBV 
on exchange’ is discussed. The ‘RBV on exchange’ claims that relational rents will be 
generated when resources are rare, valuable, nonsubstitutable, and difficult to imitate. 
Since we perceive ACAP as a dynamic capability that is inherently complex, causally 
ambiguous, widely dispersed, and often time-consuming to develop, ACAP is conceived 
as a resource that is rare, valuable, nonsubstitutable, and difficult to imitate. Accordingly, 
relational rents are to be expected, and the determinants of relational rents are assumed 
to affect interfirm ACAP.   
4.2.1 Ambidexterity 
Ambidexterity refers to the firm’s ability to simultaneously explore and exploit (e.g., 
O’Reilly and Tushman, 2008), or - at a more abstract level - simultaneously achieve 
adaptability and alignment (Gibson and Birkenshaw, 2004). Firms overemphasizing 
exploration (geared toward adaptability) will suffer the costs of experimentation without 
the benefits of commercialization, while firms overemphasizing exploitation (geared 
toward alignment) may find themselves trapped in “suboptimal stable equilibria” 
(March, 1991: 71). At the same time, both learning types require “fundamentally 
different and inconsistent architectures and competencies” (Jansen, et al., 2009: 797). 
Whereas exploration is associated with search, discovery, risk taking, experimentation, 
play, flexibility, innovation, autonomy and variance-increasing activities, exploitation is 
about refinement, choice, production, efficiency, control, certainty, discipline, selection, 
implementation, execution and variance-decreasing activities (March, 1991; Floyd 
and Lane, 2000; Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2003; Smith and Tushman, 2005; O’Reilly and 
Tushman, 2008). Firms have to face the paradoxical challenge of simultaneously balancing 
the conflicting tensions between exploration and exploitation to be successful (He and 
Wong, 2004; Jansen, et al., 2009).
Vital to this matter is the distinction between structural and contextual ambidexterity 
(Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004). Structural ambidexterity refers to a structural solution 
to the paradox between exploration and exploitation. Instead of making a trade-off 
(either/or) between the conflicting demands, dual structures are put in place (both/and). 
Business units or groups within business units focus on alignment, while others focus on 
adaptation. To generate ambidexterity both competences need to be effectively mobilized, 
coordinated, and integrated. It also needs managers to decide on how to form units or 
groups and how to allocate resources across these units or groups (Jansen et al., 2009). 
Contextual ambidexterity, on the other hand, arises from the features of its organizational 
context. It is defined as “the behavioral capacity to simultaneously demonstrate alignment 
and adaptability across an entire business unit.” (Gibson and Birkenshaw, 2004: 209). 
In contrast to structural ambidexterity there is no explicit division and allocation of 
resources. Instead alignment and adaptability are supposed to be an integral part of the 
behaviors of all relevant managers. 
Ambidexterity coincides with the concept of dynamic capabilities, defined as “the firm’s 
ability to integrate, build and reconfigure internal and external competencies to address 
rapidly changing environments.” (Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997: 516).  From a contextual 
ambidexterity point of view we endorse O’Reilly and Tushman’s assertion that “dynamic 
capabilities are at the heart of the ability of a business to be ambidextrous” (2008: 190). 
Especially in dynamic markets, firms with well-developed dynamic capabilities are likely 
to outperform firms with less developed dynamic capabilities, because of their greater 
flexibility in creating and deploying their resource base, to better match the demands 
from the market.  
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4.2.2 ACAP’s dynamic capabilities
Building on the dynamic capabilities approach, Zahra and George (2002) have 
conceptualized ACAP as a dynamic capability that relates to knowledge creation and 
utilization. ACAP is defined as “a set of organizational routines and processes by which 
firms acquire, assimilate, transform, and exploit knowledge to produce a dynamic 
organizational capability.” (2002: 186). The four dimensions of ACAP - acquisition, 
assimilation, transformation, and exploitation - play different but complementary roles. 
Acquisition stands for the firm’s capability to identify and acquire externally generated 
knowledge that is critical to its operations. Assimilation denotes the firm’s routines and 
processes that allow it to analyze, process, interpret, and understand the information 
obtained from external sources. The dimensions of acquisition and assimilation form the 
firm’s potential ACAP (PACAP) and correspond to explorative learning. Transformation 
refers to the firm’s capability to develop and refine the routines that facilitate combining 
existing knowledge and the newly acquired and assimilated knowledge. Exploitation is 
based on the routines that allow firms to refine, extend, and leverage existing competencies, 
or to create new ones by incorporating acquired and transformed knowledge into 
its operations.3 The firm’s realized ACAP (RACAP) comprises the dimensions of 
transformation and exploitation and corresponds to exploitative learning. 
Although theoretically distinct, in practice PACAP and RACAP coexist at all times, and 
both fulfill a necessary but insufficient condition to achieve long-term performance 
(Zahra and George, 2002). Irrespective of the effectiveness of their RACAP, firms with 
an underdeveloped PACAP have to stick to their current capabilities and run the risk 
of falling into a competence trap (e.g., Ahuja and Lampert, 2001). Firms with a well-
developed PACAP, and an underdeveloped RACAP will suffer the costs of knowledge 
creation, without having the opportunity to capitalize on the benefits of it (e.g., Levinthal 
and March, 1993). PACAP and RACAP build upon each other. Only in the case of highly 
effective PACAP and RACAP firms are flexible in using their resources and capabilities, 
and are able to reconfigure their resource base to match the shifting demands of the 
market (Zahra and George, 2002).  
This requirement is not easily met. From their single-loop learning, and resource oriented 
conceptualization of ACAP4, Cohen and Levinthal (1990) proposed that the firm’s ACAP 
is a function of the ACAP of its individual members, and concurrently depends on the 
organizational processes and routines that support internal and external communication 
and the distribution of expertise.  As a result, ACAP tends to develop cumulatively, and 
is path-dependent. Elaborating on Cohen and Levinthal’s conceptualization, Lane and 
Lubatkin (1998) have added that a firm’s ACAP is a relative, rather than an absolute 
construct. As a consequence, a firm’s ACAP also depends on the relative characteristics of 
the knowledge source involved.  
3  The definitions of the four ACAP dimensions are drawn from Zahra and George (2002: 189-190).
4  This orientation reflects that competitive advantage is basically a function of owing scarce resources, 
rather than a firm’s ability to create and effectively deploy the resource base (Lane et al., 2006).
Zahra and George (2002) have extended Cohen and Levinthal’s “traditional view of 
ACAP”, and conceive ACAP as a bundle of knowledge-based capabilities embedded in a 
firm’s structure, routines, and strategic processes.  Borrowing - and coinciding - Gibson 
and Birkenshaw’s expression concerning the capabilities of alignment and adaptation, we 
assert that ACAP tends to be inherently “complex, causally ambiguous, widely dispersed, 
and often time-consuming to develop” (2004: 209-210). 
4.2.3 RBV, the relational view
So far ambidexterity and ACAP have been described and discussed from the firm-level 
perspective.  We now shift our attention to the interfirm level.  It can be rewarding for a 
firm to expand its knowledge scope beyond its boundaries, as learning will be fostered not 
only by the firm’s internal capabilities, but also by the firm’s ties with the outside world. As 
such, a firm’s critical resources may span firm boundaries and be embedded in interfirm 
processes and routines (Dyer and Singh, 1998). 
Projected on the main premise of RBV, Dyer and Singh have claimed that relational 
rents will be generated when resources are rare, valuable, nonsubstitutable, and difficult 
to imitate. They define a relational rent as “a supernormal profit jointly generated in an 
exchange relationship that cannot be generated by either firm in isolation and can only 
be created through the joint idiosyncratic contributions of the specific alliance partners. 
“ (1998: 662). Relational rents will occur only if the relationship is moved away from the 
attributes of an arm’s-length relationship. This condition is fulfilled when alliance partners 
“combine, exchange, or invest in idiosyncratic assets, knowledge and resources/capabilities, 
and/or they employ effective governance mechanisms that lower transaction costs or 
permit the realization of rents through the synergistic combination of assets, knowledge 
or capabilities” (1998: 662). Accordingly, complementary resources, knowledge-sharing 
routines and capabilities, relation-specific assets, and effective governance are proposed 
to be the determinants of relational rents.
Our claim is as follows. ACAP is conceived as a dynamic capability that tends to be 
inherently complex, causally ambiguous, widely dispersed, and often time-consuming to 
develop.  RBV postulates that firms which succeed in developing resources that are rare, 
valuable, nonsubstitutable, and difficult to imitate will achieve a sustainable competitive 
advantage (Barney, 1991). Being rare, valuable, nonsubstitutable, and difficult to imitate, 
ACAP is a critical resource (e.g., Zahra and George, 2002; Jansen et al., 2009) that ultimately 
will lead to relational rents. Accordingly, since relational rents are made possible only 
if the relationship moves away from the attributes of an arm’s-length relationship (Dyer 
and Singh, 1998), we hypothesize that the determinants of relational rents are, at least in 
principle, also the drivers of interfirm ACAP.
We propose that PACAP and RACAP simultaneously lead to ambidexterity, and that both 
subsets of ACAP are functions of the determinants of relational rents. Hence the drivers 
of interfirm ACAP are implicitly also the drivers of ambidexterity. More specifically we 
consider the following subsets of variables: 
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1. the complementarity between both partners, i.e., strategic complementarity 
(‘complementarity’) and organizational complementarity (‘compatibility’)5; 
2. the connectedness between both partners; 
3. the partners’ mutual investments in relation-specific assets, i.e., idiosyncratic resources;
4. the relationship’s governance mechanisms, i.e., contracting and relational norms.  
Figure 4.1 depicts our conceptual model. We hypothesize that complementarity between 
both partners provides the potential for interfirm learning, but – as will be further 
explained later - it is the quality of the relationship that enables the extraction of this 
learning potential (Parkhe, 1991; Madhok and Tallman, 1998; Sarkar, Echambadi, 
Cavusgil, and Aulakh, 2001). Accordingly, based on the RBV (the relational view) 
and the results of previous studies, complementarity is considered an antecedent of 
interfirm ACAP, and compatibility, connectedness, idiosyncratic resources, contracting 
and relational norms the generative mechanisms that mediate the relationship between 
knowledge complementarity and interfirm PACAP and RACAP. PACAP and RACAP, 
in turn, are hypothesized to affect ambidexterity. In Figure 4.1 the direct effect between 
complementarity and PACAP, and the direct effect between complementarity and RACAP 
are represented by a dotted line.
Figure 4.1: Conceptual model.
5  Both strategic complementarity (based on potential combinations of resources) and organizational 
complementarity (the compatibility between the alliance partners’ organizational systems, processes, and 
cultures) are part of Dyer and Singh’s complementarity construct (1998: 668).  In our research model we 
distinguish between ‘complementarity’ (strategic complementarity) and ‘compatibility’ (organizational 
complementarity). We make this distinction, because strategic complementarity is basically an initial 
condition, while organizational complementarity can be (further) developed to (better) fit the requirements of 
the relationship (Doz, 1996).
Now that we have defined the variables that influence ACAP and ambidexterity, we have 
discussed the most important ingredients of our conceptual model. Next, we’ll introduce 
the drivers of ACAP and ambidexterity in more detail and specify hypotheses.
4.3  CONSTRUCTION OF THE CONCEPTUAL MODEL: DESCRIBING 
 VARIABLES AND THEIR LINKS
4.3.1 Complementarity 
Complementary competences, or  ”the degree to which the firms are able to fill out, or 
complete, each other’s performance by supplying distinct capabilities, knowledge, and 
resources” (Jap, 1999: 465), is widely acknowledged as one of the main factors underlying 
interfirm success. Complementarity implies that both partners possess different, but 
valuable capabilities. Once brought into the relationship, it creates the potential for 
interfirm learning (e.g., Parkhe, 1991; Mowery, Oxley and Silverman, 1996; Larsson and 
Finkelstein, 1999; Inkpen, 2002; Lane et al., 2006). 
At the firm level, Cohen and Levinthal (1990) have conceived ACAP as primarily a 
function of its prior related knowledge, which suggests two features of ACAP that will affect 
innovative performance. First, the accumulation of ACAP in a particular area will result in 
a more efficient accumulation of ACAP in a next period. Next, prior related knowledge will 
enhance the firm’s ability to predict the nature and commercial potential of intermediate 
technological advances (ibid.). On the interfirm level, complementarity implies that both 
partners bring different, but related prior knowledge into the relationship. This enhances 
the relationship’s capacity to accumulate ACAP and spot intermediate advances beyond 
the capacity of the individual partners. As such we assume PACAP as well as RACAP 
to benefit from the accumulated features resulting from complementarity. However, as 
previously asserted, we expect this direct effect to be mediated by the combined effect 
of compatibility, connectedness, idiosyncratic resources, contracting, and relational 
norms. In other words, we expect complementarity to provide the potential for interfirm 
learning, and the combined effect of compatibility, connectedness, idiosyncratic resources, 
contracting, and relational norms to be the mechanism that enables the extraction of 
this learning potential, and thus the mechanism through which complementarity affects 
PACAP and RACAP (and ultimately ambidexterity).
Hypothesis 1a: Complementarity will be positively related to PACAP (H1a1), and the effect 
of complementarity on PACAP will be mediated by the combined effect of compatibility, 
connectedness, idiosyncratic resources, contracting, and relational norms (H1a2). 
Hypothesis 1b: Complementarity will be positively related to RACAP (H1b1), and the effect 
of complementarity on RACAP will be mediated by the combined effect of compatibility, 
connectedness, idiosyncratic resources, contracting, and relational norms (H1b2). 
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At the firm level, Cohen and Levinthal (1990) have conceived ACAP as primarily a 
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norms. In other words, we expect complementarity to provide the potential for interfirm 
learning, and the combined effect of compatibility, connectedness, idiosyncratic resources, 
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this learning potential, and thus the mechanism through which complementarity affects 
PACAP and RACAP (and ultimately ambidexterity).
Hypothesis 1a: Complementarity will be positively related to PACAP (H1a1), and the effect 
of complementarity on PACAP will be mediated by the combined effect of compatibility, 
connectedness, idiosyncratic resources, contracting, and relational norms (H1a2). 
Hypothesis 1b: Complementarity will be positively related to RACAP (H1b1), and the effect 
of complementarity on RACAP will be mediated by the combined effect of compatibility, 
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4.3.2 Compatibility
Interfirm compatibility is defined as the congruence in organizational goals and objectives, 
as well as similarity in operating philosophies and corporate cultures from the partnering 
firms (Bucklin and Sengupta, 1993). In their study on R&D alliances, Lane and Lubatkin 
(1998) have found that interorganizational learning is facilitated by similar organizational 
structures, similar compensation practices, and shared operational priorities or “dominant 
logics”. Lyles and Salk (1996) have argued that cultural differences sometimes lead to an 
unbalanced situation between joint venture partners in their effort to process knowledge. 
Lei, Slocum, and Pitts (1997) have argued that alliances among partners with different 
cultural backgrounds are harder to manage than alliances among members with the 
same cultural background. Partners that share similarities in their systems and cultures 
are better able to interact, which positively affects the partnership’s ability to integrate 
and transform incongruent pools of tacit knowledge into value creation (Parkhe, 1991; 
Dyer and Singh, 1998; Sarkar, et al., 2001). At the same time operational and cultural 
compatibility serve as means for behavior control and expectation management (Lane and 
Lubatkin, 1988; Jap, 2001; Sarkar, et al., 2001). 
Since the assimilation of acquired knowledge, as well as the transformation and exploitation 
of assimilated knowledge require coordinated action, especially when tacit knowledge 
is involved (Dhanaraj, Lyles, Steensma, and Tihanyi, 2004), we assume compatibility 
to positively affect PACAP and RACAP. We also expect compatibility to mediate the 
relationship between complementarity and the interfirm capability to explore and exploit. 
The learning potential associated with complementarity can only be transformed into 
value creation if the partnering firms’ cultures and systems are compatible enough to 
enable coordinated action (Dyer and Singh, 1998). Accordingly, partnering firms may 
alter their relationship strategy, and adjust their management and operating styles to 
better fit the requirements of the relationship (Doz, 1998).    
Hypothesis 2a: Compatibility will mediate the relationship between complementarity and 
PACAP (H2a1), where complementarity will be positively related to compatibility (H2a2), 
and compatibility will be positively related to PACAP (H2a3).
Hypothesis 2b: Compatibility will mediate the relationship between complementarity and 
RACAP (H2b1), where complementarity will be positively related to compatibility (H2b2), 
and compatibility will be positively related to RACAP (H2b3).
4.3.3 Connectedness
In contrast to information, which contains easily codifiable knowledge, know-how 
involves knowledge that is tacit, sticky, complex, and difficult to codify (Kogut and Zander, 
1992; Szulanski, 1996). Because of these properties, know-how is difficult to imitate 
and transfer, which makes advantages built on know-how likely to be more sustainable 
compared to advantages built on information (Reed and DeFillipi, 1990; Dyer and Singh, 
1998; Das and Teng, 2000). If partner complementarity involves know-how, an iterative 
process of exchange is required that entails direct, intimate, and extensive interactions 
among the individual members of the alliance partners (Marsden, 1990; Szulanski, 1996; 
Kale et al., 2000; Meier, 2011). Accordingly, we expect complementarity to positively affect 
connectedness and connectedness to mediate the relationship between complementarity 
and relational rents.
From an intrafirm perspective Jaworski and Kohli (1993) have defined connectedness as 
the degree of formal and informal direct contact among employees across departments. 
Connectedness enables individual members to develop an understanding of who knows 
what, and where critical expertise resides within and outside the organization (Cohan and 
Levinthal, 1990; Dyer and Singh, 1998; Kale et al., 2000). It also serves as a governance 
mechanism; dense linkages support the development of trust and cooperation among 
organizational members (Jaworski and Kohli, 1993; Rowley, Behrens, and Krackhardt, 
2000; Adler and Kwon, 2002). Next, connectedness plays an important role in the 
development of shared codes and language (Hansen, 2002), and functions as a mechanism 
that reduces the likelihood of disruptive conflicts (Krackhardt and Stern, 1988; Kale et 
al., 2000; Rindfleisch and Moorman, 2001). Connectedness, however, may also result in 
collective blindness; dense linkages may cause redundancy of information and limited 
access to divergent perspectives (Uzzi, 1997; Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998; Rowley et al., 
2000; Jansen et al., 2005, 2006; Todorova and Durisin, 2007).
We expect connectedness to work beneficially for a relationship’s PACAP, until up to a 
certain level. Connectedness will facilitate interfirm interaction and support exchange 
of information. This will increase the relationship’s capacity to acquire and assimilate 
external knowledge, as well as its capacity to transform and exploit assimilated knowledge. 
At higher levels of connectedness, however, dense linkages will blindfold the relationship 
to alternative knowledge sources and divergent interpretations. Since exploration is 
amongst others associated with search, discovery, risk taking, experimentation, and 
variance-increasing activities, we expect that higher levels of connectedness will cause 
rigidities and  impede the relationship’s explorative capabilities. Accordingly, we presume 
a positive relationship between connectedness and PACAP, that levels off at higher levels 
of connectedness. Since exploitation is amongst others associated with refinement, 
efficiency, control, and variance reduction, we expect a positive relationship between 
connectedness and RACAP, also where higher levels of connectedness are involved (e.g., 
Jansen et al., 2005, 2006).  
Hypothesis 3a: Connectedness will mediate the relationship between complementarity 
and PACAP (H3a1), where complementarity will be positively related to connectedness 
(H3a2), and there will be a positive relationship between connectedness and PACAP (H3a3), 
that levels off at higher levels of connectedness (H3a4).
Hypothesis 3b: Connectedness will mediate the relationship between complementarity 
and RACAP (H3b1), where complementarity will be positively related to connectedness 
(H3b2), and connectedness will be positively related to RACAP (H3b3).
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4.3.4 Idiosyncratic resources
Mutual idiosyncratic investments will lead to idiosyncratic resources. Like idiosyncratic 
investments, idiosyncratic resources are unique to the alliance and may have little or 
no value if they were redeployed for another purpose (Anderson and Weitz, 1992; Jap, 
1999; Wittman, Hunt, and Arnett, 2009). Unlike complementary resources, which are 
brought to the relationship, idiosyncratic resources are developed within the relationship 
(Lambe, Spekman, and Hunt, 2002). Furthermore, through the process of integrating 
complementary resources, idiosyncratic resources allow the alliance to extract the learning 
potential offered by the complementarity between both partners (ibid.) and synergistic 
effects may occur (Jap, 1999; Das and Teng, 2002; Wittman et al., 2009). Because of this 
potential outcome, complementarity motivates the development of idiosyncratic resources 
(Jap, 1999; Lambe et al., 2002). 
Williamson (1985) identified four asset specificity dimensions: site specificity, physical 
asset specificity, human asset specificity and dedicated assets. Although all dimensions 
point to essentially the same phenomenon (Joskow, 1988), primarily investments in 
human assets seem to play an important role in the development of ACAP. Human asset 
specificity increases over time, as “transactors develop experience working together 
and accumulate specialized knowledge, language, and know-how that allow them 
to communicate efficiently and effectively.” (Dyer, 1996: 273-274). These advanced 
communication capabilities become manifest in less misinterpretation of information, 
increased reliability of feedback and improved collaboration (ibid.).  Since information 
sharing is a necessary first step in relational learning, and interpretation of the shared 
information is conditioned by the relationship-specific element of dialogue (Selnes and 
Sallis, 2003), we expect PACAP to benefit from the advanced communication capabilities 
offered by idiosyncratic investments in human assets. We also expect RACAP to benefit, 
since the accumulation of specialized knowledge, language, and know-how will stimulate 
refinement, efficiency, control, and variance reduction.
Hypothesis 4a: Idiosyncratic resources will mediate the relationship between 
complementarity and PACAP (H4a1), where complementarity will be positively related 
to idiosyncratic resources (H4a2), and idiosyncratic resources will be positively related to 
PACAP (H4a3).
Hypothesis 4b: Idiosyncratic resources will mediate the relationship between 
complementarity and RACAP (H4b1), where complementarity will be positively related 
to idiosyncratic resources (H4b2), and idiosyncratic resources will be positively related to 
RACAP (H4b3).
4.3.5 Contracting
“Governance defines the explicit and implicit rules of exchange between economic 
parties.” (Ghosh and John, 2005: 346). Effective governance has been mentioned as one 
of the determinants of relational rents (Dyer and Singh, 1998). Effective governance 
supports the alignment of incentives; it “encourages the partners to be transparent, to 
transfer knowledge, and not to free ride on the knowledge acquired from the partner.” 
(ibid.: 666). Accordingly, effective governance mechanisms “will lower transaction 
costs or permit the realization of rents through the synergistic combination of assets, 
knowledge or capabilities” (ibid.: 662). As a consequence, we expect complementarity to 
positively affect (the need for) effective governance and effective governance to mediate 
the relationship between complementarity and relational rents. In the next section we will 
focus on relational norms. The first governance structure we take into consideration is 
formal contracting. 
Formalization is the degree to which rules, procedures, instructions, and communication 
are laid down in written documents or formal systems (Jansen et al., 2005). In their 
studies on interdepartmental, intrafirm relationships, Jansen et al. proposed formalization 
to be negatively related to PACAP (2005) and exploratory innovation (2006). Being 
part of a company’s system capabilities (Van den Bosch, Volberda, and De Boer, 1999), 
formalization “program(s) behaviors in advance of their execution and provide a memory 
for handling routine situations” (Jansen et al., 2005: 1002). Accordingly, formalization 
will reduce the likelihood that individuals will deviate from “established behavior”, which 
will constrain exploration efforts (ibid.). On the other hand, “formalization supports 
the retrieval of knowledge that has already been internalized and enhances the causal 
understanding of sets of tasks within units.” (ibid.). As a result, formalization will be 
helpful in finding opportunities for the transformation of new external knowledge. 
Furthermore, formalization “codif(ies) best practices”, which makes knowledge ”more 
efficient to exploit, easier to apply, and faster to implement.”(ibid.).  Accordingly, Jansen 
et al. proposed formalization to be positively related to RACAP (2005), and exploitative 
innovation (2006).
Analogue to Stinchcombe’s (1985) finding that contracting involves the establishment of 
a vertical firm authority relation, which is the functional equivalent of an organizational 
hierarchy, we propose that formal contracting in a vertical interfirm relationship is the 
functional equivalent of an organization’s system capabilities, which include formalization. 
Accordingly, based on Jansen et al.’s (2005; 2006) argumentation, we expect a negative 
relationship between contracting and PACAP, and a positive relationship between 
contracting and RACAP.
Hypothesis 5a: Contracting will mediate the relationship between complementarity and 
PACAP (H5a1), where complementarity will be positively related to contracting (H5a2) and 
contracting will be negatively related to PACAP (H5a3).
Hypothesis 5b: Contracting will mediate the relationship between complementarity and 
RACAP (H5b1), where complementarity will be positively related to contracting (H5b2), and 
contracting will be positively related to RACAP (H5b3).
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4.3.6 Relational norms
Norms can be defined as expectations about behavior that are at least partially shared by 
a group of decision makers (Heide and John, 1992). Discrete norms contain expectations 
about autonomous individual actors, acting toward the fulfilment of their own goals. 
Relational norms are based on expectations about the alliance partners’ mutuality of 
interests, and aim at the enhancement of “the wellbeing of the relationship as a whole” 
(ibid: 34). Depending on the specific characteristics of the relationship, relational norms 
evolve over time (Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh, 1987; Ring and Van de Ven, 1992), may 
involve considerable costs in terms of time and resource allocation (Cannon, Achrol, 
and Gundlach, 2000), and include different but related norm types (Macneil, 1980), of 
which (1) flexibility, (2) information exchange, and (3) solidarity appear to be the most 
relevant (Heide and John, 1992; Cannon et al., 2000; Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Paulin 
and Ferguson, 2010). 
The norm type flexibility (ad. 1) reflects the expectation that the alliance partners are 
willing to make adaptations to cope with changing circumstances, taking into account 
partner’s interests. The norm type information exchange (ad. 2) reflects the expectation 
that the alliance partners will proactively provide information that is helpful to the 
other partner. The norm type solidarity (ad. 3) reflects the expectation that the alliance 
partners value the relationship and hence, are committed to the relationship (Heide and 
John, 1992). Relational norms foster trust6, and once partners perceive their counterpart 
as being trustworthy, they are more inclined to share information (Inkpen and Tsang, 
2005; Lee and Cavusgil, 2006; Crosno and Dahlstrom, 2008; Sun and Anderson, 2010; 
Li, Poppo, and Zhou, 2010). Hence, due to relational trust, individual alliance members 
will feel comfortable in sharing sensitive information, and accordingly relational trust will 
reduce the imposed protective constraints put on sharing knowledge, which will cut the 
transaction costs of the exchange (Chapters 1, 2 and 3). 
We expect relational norms to fit the requirements for exploration. Relational norms 
reduce the barriers to information sharing and encourage the interaction between 
alliance members. Furthermore, the general expectations relational norms are based 
on, allow for search, discovery, risk taking, experimentation, play, flexibility, etcetera. 
Accordingly, we assume relational norms to be positively related to PACAP. We also 
expect that the information sharing and collaborative capacities of relational norms 
will stimulate exploitation. As argued by Zahra and George, “knowledge exploitation 
requires the sharing of relevant knowledge in order to promote mutual understanding and 
comprehension.” (2002: 194). Moreover, literature reveals that although formal contracting 
 
6  In section 1.4 we introduced ‘strong bonding’, which relates to changes in preferences caused by the 
interaction within the exchange relationship, and ‘strong solidarity’, which relates to social norms exogenous to 
the relationship. In Berger et al. (1993) we introduced ‘the blanket concept of trust’, covering ‘strong bonding’ 
and ‘strong solidarity’, as the preferences benign to the preservation of the relationship, as well as the social 
norms that enable parties in an exchange relationship to renounce enforcement mechanisms such as private 
ordering and legal contracts. Accordingly, in this study we conceive relational norms as trust endogenous to 
the relationship, and use ‘relational norms’ and ‘relational trust’ interchangeably.
may be highly effective when information is highly explicit and uncertainty is low, informal 
controls will be more effective when information is ambiguous and organizationally 
embedded, and uncertainty is high (Makhija and Ganesh, 1997; Cannon et al., 2000; Uzzi 
and Lancaster, 2003; Inkpen and Curall, 2004). Accordingly, in long-term buyer-supplier 
relationships we assume relational norms to be positively related to RACAP. 
We however, take notice of the decreasing effect of high levels of relational trust on both 
ACAP dimensions, also referred to as ‘the dark site of trust’ (e.g., Dyer and Singh, 1998; 
Selnes and Sallis, 2003; Noordhoff et al., 2011). Accordingly, higher levels of relational 
norms may result in: (1) a systematic avoidance of negative information, because the 
partners believe the good atmosphere in the relationship needs to be preserved; (2) a lack of 
critical information search, due to a reduced questioning of the status quo; (3) a heightened 
risk of opportunistic behavior, due to the relaxation of explicit control mechanisms; and, 
(4) a reduction of creativity, because the partners converge in their thinking (Selnes and 
Sallis, 2003). Hence, we presume a positive relationship between relational norms and 
both ACAP dimensions, that levels off at higher levels of relational norms.  
Hypothesis 6a: Relational norms will mediate the relationship between complementarity 
and PACAP (H6a1), where complementarity will be positively related to relational norms 
(H6a2), and there will be a positive relationship between relational norms and PACAP 
(H6a3), that levels off at higher levels of relational norms (H6a4).
Hypothesis 6b: Relational norms will mediate the relationship between complementarity 
and RACAP (H6b1), where complementarity will be positively related to relational norms 
(H6b2), and there will be a positive relationship between relational norms and RACAP 
(H6b3), that levels off at higher levels of relational norms (H6b4).
4.3.7 Ambidexterity
As described in the introduction, PACAP corresponds to exploratory learning, while 
RACAP corresponds to exploitative learning. Ambidexterity refers to the ability to 
simultaneously explore and exploit. Accordingly, we expect a positive relationship 
between both subsets of ACAP and ambidexterity. We investigate these effects, because 
support would verify the nomological validity of our measures of the ACAP construct 
(Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer, 2001), and confirm the importance of our findings. 
Hypothesis 7a:  PACAP will be positively related to ambidexterity (H7a1).
Hypothesis 7b: RACAP will be positively related to ambidexterity (H7b1). 
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4.4 METHOD
4.4.1 Data collection procedure
Our object of analysis is the vertical relationship between independent firms operating 
at successive stages in the production chain. A relationship is real, but it is not directly 
observable, which imposes large potential for measurement error (Selnes and Sallis, 2003). 
To overcome this problem, data were obtained from key informants from both sides of the 
dyad (John and Reve, 1982; Heide and John, 1992; Lane and Lubatkin, 1998; Selnes and 
Sallis, 2003). Heads of purchasing or high-ranking technology managers were invited to 
participate and were asked to supply contact data of four people within their companies 
who were central to their customer relationships. Since manufacturing firms show a 
higher probability to systematically acquire the external knowledge necessary to conceive 
new or improved products and or processes (e.g, Arbussà and Coenders, 2007), service 
firms were excluded from the study. To support variance, the choice of industries (viz. 
automotive, machinery, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, semiconductors and electronics) 
was based on prior research describing different knowledge strategies in these industries 
(Lichtenthaler and Ernst, 2007). 
To prevent selection bias, and following Johnson et al. (2004), four relationships were 
selected following a 2x2 design, with a relationship duration greater or less than two years 
on one dimension, and average or crucial importance of products or components on the 
other dimension. After the buyer informants were recruited, they were asked to supply 
the names of their contacts in the supplier organization. The researchers then contacted 
the identified informant in the supplier organization and asked her, but mostly him to 
participate in the study. Customer informants, all located in the Netherlands, were then 
interviewed following a standardized questionnaire. Supplier informants located all 
over of the world, received and returned the standardized questionnaire by (e-)mail. All 
responses were (promised to be) treated with absolute confidentiality; i.e. only company 
codes were included into the database in order to be able to match both sides of the dyad. 
To check the involvement and knowledgeability of the respondents (Campbell, 1955), we 
determined their current working position, the number of years they have been involved 
in the relationship, and the percentage of time they spend on the relationship. In this 
way, between June 2011 and April 2013, data were obtained from 166 matched-pair 
relationships.
4.4.2 Measures
In this study existing scales from previous research were used. Some were previously 
discussed in buyer-supplier relationship literature, while others were developed in the 
context of firm learning, intrafirm learning, or interfirm learning not related to buyer-
supplier relationships (e.g., international joint ventures, mergers and acquisitions). These 
measures were extended to vertical interfirm relationships. In this study we use first-order 
and second-order constructs. 
A first-order construct is a latent construct that has observed variables as indicators, whereas 
second-order constructs have other latent (first-order) constructs as their indicators.7 
Furthermore, depending on the causal link between the indicators and the latent construct, 
we differentiate between reflective and formative scales. Reflective indicators ‘reflect’ the 
latent construct; changes in the value of the latent construct determine changes in the 
value of the indicators. Hence, high correlations are assumed among reflective indicators. 
Formative indicators cause the latent construct;  changes in the value of the indicators 
determine changes in the latent construct. Formative indicators are expected to measure 
different aspects of the same construct, therefore formative indicators of the same latent 
construct are not related (Bollen and Lennox, 1991; Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer, 
2001; Hair et al., 2011).8 We interviewed colleagues, revised questions, and pre-tested the 
first questionnaire among seven buyers and four suppliers. To prevent nonresponse, the 
questionnaire was translated into Dutch and was offered in English as well. All translations 
were based on the English original, and then back-translated from Dutch into English. 
People fluent in both English and Dutch compared the original and the back-translated 
English questionnaire and adjusted the Dutch questionnaire when needed. Table 4.A1 
(Appendix 4.1) presents the measurement scales, the format of the scales, and its sources. 
Likert scales, ranging from “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (7), were used for 
all questions (e.g., Jap, 1999), with the exception of the items measuring explorative 
learning performance (Lane et al., 2001), which were anchored by “to no extent” and 
“to a great extent”.
The measures of complementarity were developed by Jap (1999), and modified by Lambe 
et al. (2002). Compatibility is defined as the congruence in organizational goals and 
objectives, as well as similarity in operating philosophies and corporate cultures from the 
partnering firms (Bucklin and Sengupta, 1993). We took two items from Kale et al. (2000) 
measuring the compatibility between the organizational cultures, and the management 
and operating styles of both partners. We added one item from Geringer (1988) to 
also cover the fit between both partners’ objectives. Connectedness was measured by a 
scale developed by Jaworsky and Kohli (1993), and adapted by Jansen et al. (2006). The 
measures covering idiosyncratic resources are from Lambe et al. (2002). In Lambe et al.’s 
(2002) original work two items were deleted during the validity testing procedure. From 
our pre-test it became clear that these two items did not pass the validity check, possibly 
because the pronoun ‘we’ was mistakenly interpreted as ‘our company’. Since all remaining 
items were explicitly related to both partners, we changed ‘we’ into ‘we both’, and included 
both items in the construct. 
7  As an illustration: in our study the second-order construct relational norms is measured by the first-
order constructs flexibility, information exchange, and solidarity. The indicators of these first-order constructs 
are listed in Table 4.A1 (Appendix 4.1).
8  As an illustration: the indicators of complementarity reflect the latent construct and hence a high value 
for one indicator presupposes high values for the other indicators. In contrast, the indicators of compatibility 
cause the latent construct rather than being caused by the latent construct. Accordingly a high value for 
‘compatibility of organizational cultures’ does not imply a high value for ‘strategic fit between objectives’ and/or 
‘complementarity between management and operating styles’.
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measures were extended to vertical interfirm relationships. In this study we use first-order 
and second-order constructs. 
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Contracting refers to the focus and the degree of formal contractual control in the 
buyer-supplier relationship (Geringer and Hébert, 1989). Measures were obtained from 
Desphande and Zaltman (1982), Cannon and Perreault (1999), Buvik and Reve (2002), 
and Jansen et al. (2006). Relational norms (a second-order construct) was assessed using 
measures developed by Heide and John (1992), representing flexibility, information 
exchange, and solidarity norm types (first-order constructs). 
Although PACAP is associated with explorative learning and RACAP with exploitative 
learning, both ACAP dimensions basically refer to the learning capabilities of the 
relationship. The learning performance of the relationship is measured by ambidexterity. 
Ambidexterity (a second-order construct) was measured by combining the constructs of 
explorative and exploitative learning performance (first-order constructs). The explorative 
learning performance measure was originally developed for international joint ventures, 
expressing the relationship between the joint venture and its foreign parents (Lane et al., 
2001). For our purpose ‘joint creation’ and ‘new’ were added and stressed, to exclude 
the transfer of knowledge that is new to the recipient, but existing to the sender. Our 
exploitative learning performance construct (from Selnes and Sallis, 2003) refers to the 
extent, to which the partners consider their relationship worthwhile, equitable, productive, 
and satisfying (Van de Ven, 1976; Ruekert and Walker, 1987). We share Larsson and 
Finkelstein’s view that “the success of a merger or acquisition - in this study extended to 
buyer-supplier relationships - is gauged by the degree of synergy realization rather than 
more removed and potentially ambiguous criteria such as accounting or market returns.” 
(1999: 1). In their words (ibid.: 4), but extended to our research, viewing performance 
in terms of synergy realization avoids the problem of accounting-based measures that 
cannot distinguish between performance attributable to the combination and “normal” 
performance that would have accrued for the individual partners if they had remained 
independent. Synergy realization focuses solely on the value-creating activities of the 
buyer-supplier relationship. 
Appropriate scales for the dimensions of ACAP were not available and thus were specifically 
generated for this study. Since we conceive ACAP as a dynamic capability, definitions and 
components of its dimensions were obtained from Zahra and George (2002). Accordingly, 
as suggested by Lane et al. (2006), all ACAP dimensions refer to capabilities. Following 
Sun and Anderson’s (2010) multilevel perspective, the ACAP dimensions were linked to 
the individual, the group and the relationship level (indicated below in parentheses).9 
This helped us to grasp more specifically the nature of the separate dimensions. We now 
discuss the measures of the four ACAP dimensions. 
9  Sun and Anderson (2010) indicated that: (1) acquisition involves the cyclical learning process of 
intuition and interpretation, which spans the individual and group level; (2) assimilation involves the process 
of interpretation and is a group-level learning activity; (3) transformation involves the learning process of 
integration and moves from the group to the organizational learning level; (4) exploitation is an organizational 
level learning capacity and involves the learning process of institutionalization.
Acquisition (individual-group level) refers to a relationship’s capability to identify and 
acquire externally generated knowledge that is critical to its operations. ‘Prior investments‘ 
(scope of search), ‘prior knowledge’ (perceptual schema), ‘intensity’ (new connections), 
‘speed’ (of learning) and ‘direction’ (quality of learning) are its relevant components. 
Todorova and Durisin (2007) claimed that Zahra and George neglect the ‘valuing’ part 
of the acquisition construct and place undue emphasis on the efforts spent on acquiring 
knew knowledge. Like Sun and Anderson (2010) we believe that Zahra and George do 
recognize the need for valuing new knowledge. Both elements of acquisition were included 
in our construct measure. Prior investments and prior knowledge were excluded from our 
construct measure, since in our theoretical model both components are antecedents of 
absorptive capacity, rather than parts of the acquisition construct.  Measures were based 
on previous work by Szulanski (1996), and Camisón and Forés (2010).
Assimilation (group level) refer to a firm’s routines and processes that allow it to 
analyze, process, interpret and understand the information obtained from external 
sources. ‘Understanding‘ (interpretation, comprehension, learning) is its relevant 
component. Measures were based on previous work by Jansen et al. (2005), and Camisón 
and Forés (2010).
Transformation (group-relationship level) denotes a firm’s capability to develop and refine 
the routines that facilitate the combination of existing knowledge and the newly acquired 
and assimilated knowledge. The components of transformation are ’internalization’ and 
‘conversion’. Both terms, however, are not explained well. This leaves space for alternative 
interpretations. On the one hand one could argue that conversion relates to ‘matching new 
to what is already known’, and internalization to ‘how such knowledge is shared between 
and transferred to different parts of the organization’ (Lane et al., 2006). On the other 
hand it might fit Todorova and Durisin’s (2007) distinction between incremental and 
radical learning (Sun and Anderson, 2010). Following their line of reasoning: if the new 
idea fits the existing cognitive scheme well, the new idea is only slightly altered to improve 
the fit and then incorporated into the existing structures. The existing cognitive structure 
does not change, and the knowledge is ‘internalized’. If new situations or ideas cannot 
realistically be altered to fit the existing knowledge structures, new knowledge cannot be 
internalized. In this case the cognitive structures of the individuals themselves must be 
‘conversed’ to adapt to an idea or situation that they are not able to internalize. In our study 
‘matching new to what is already known’ includes both (items related to) incremental 
and radical learning. The last four items relate to ‘how such knowledge is shared between 
and transferred to different parts of the organization’ (Lane et al., 2006). Measures are 
based on previous studies by Bontis, Crossan, and Hulland (2002), and Cadiz, Sawyer, 
and Griffith (2009).
Exploitation (group level) is based on the routines that allow firms to refine, extend, 
and leverage existing competencies or to create new ones by incorporating acquired 
and transformed knowledge into its operations. The relevant components are ‘use’ and 
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‘implementation’ (core competencies, harvesting resources). Measures are based on 
previous studies by Jansen et al. (2005), Cadiz et al. (2009), and Camisón and Forés (2010).
Since respondents’ reflections on the relationship implicitly include perceptions of 
individuals and groups, individual and group level characteristics (with a few exceptions) 
were not explicitly mentioned. PACAP (a second-order construct) was measured by 
combining the dimensions of acquisition and assimilation (first-order constructs). RACAP 
(a second-order construct) was measured by combining the dimensions of transformation 
and exploitation (first-order constructs).
4.4.3 Statistical procedures
One of the key elements of our conceptual model (Figure 4.1) is the appearance of 
mediating variables. A variable functions as a mediator as the following conditions 
hold (Baron and Kenny, 1986). First, the independent variable must affect the mediator. 
Second, the mediator must affect the dependent variable. Third, the independent variable 
must affect the dependent variable. Mediation occurs when regressing the dependent 
variable on the combination of the independent variable and the mediator, a previously 
significant relation between the dependent and independent variable is no longer 
significant (complete mediation), or, more realistically (ibid.), the relation between the 
dependent and independent variable decreases significantly when controlled for the 
mediator (partial mediation). To estimate mediation, regression analysis assumes there 
is no measurement error in the mediator. Accordingly, the effect of the mediator on 
the dependent variable cannot totally be controlled when the effect of the independent 
variable on the dependent variable is estimated. To avoid this kind of reliability problem, 
structural modeling methods are recommended (Baron and Kenny, 1986). Opposed to 
regression, structural modeling methods incorporate the measurement error(s) of the 
mediator(s) into the model. 
We used Partial Least Squares (PLS), a variance-based Structural Equation Model (SEM) 
that combines factor analysis and multiple regression analysis (Hair, Ringle, and Sarstedt, 
2011). Compared to covariance-based SEM’s (e.g., Amos, LISREL, MPlus), PLS-SEM 
allows for complex models, non-normal data, and formative measures (e.g., Hair et al., 
2011; Ringle, Sarstedt, and Straub, 2012). Since our analytical model includes higher 
order constructs, multiple parallel mediation, and formative constructs, the choice for 
PLS seems to be justified. As some of our hypotheses assume non-linear partial relations 
between latent constructs, we chose to use WarpPLS 3.0. 
We selected the default option of Warp3 PLS Regression. This algorithm first tries to find 
an S-curve relationship between latent variables. If identified, the algorithm transforms 
(or “warps”) the scores of the predictor latent variables to reflect the S-curve relationship 
in the estimated path coefficients in the model. If a S-curve is not identified, it tries to fit 
a U-curve, and ultimately a straight line (Kock, 2012). The warping takes place after the 
estimation of all weights and loadings in the model (the measurement model), i.e. during 
the estimation of path coefficients (the structural model). While calculating weights, 
the algorithm considers the factor score as an exact linear combination (zero error) of 
its indicators (Hair et al., 2011). Next to the selection of the algorithm we selected the 
resampling method to estimate appropriate p-values. Given the sample size (n=166), 
bootstrapping seems to be the obvious resampling method.10 Warping, however, is sensitive 
for outliers (ibid.), and jackknifing is the preferred sampling method when outliers come 
into play.11 Analysis revealed that five cases showed an anomaly index greater than 2 and 
were identified as ‘unusual cases’. Closer inspection of the five cases showed that no data 
collection errors were involved, accordingly none of the cases was excluded from the 
analysis. Based on these considerations and findings we selected jackknifing as the most 
appropriate resampling method. 
The sample size of 166 largely exceeds the minimum required sample size. As suggested 
by Chin (1998), the minimum sample size for a PLS study should be equal to the larger 
of the next two conditions: (1) ten times the amount of indicators of the scale with the 
largest number of formative indicators (in our model: seven indicators), or (2) ten times 
the largest number of structural paths directed to a dependent variable (in our model: five 
structural paths).
4.5 ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
PLS-SEM analysis typically follows a two-step procedure (e.g., Hair et al., 2010; 2011). In 
the first step the measurement model is assessed. The measurement model, also referred 
to as the outer model, estimates the relationships between each latent construct and its 
associated indicators. Before assessing the structural model, the reliability and validity 
of the latent constructs’ measures are examined. Once the measurement model proves 
to be sufficiently strong, the structural model will be assessed (step two). The structural 
model, also referred to as the inner model, estimates the relationships (paths) between 
the latent constructs. 
4.5.1 Measurement model
The measurement model is developed from the combined buyer and supplier database 
(n=332), and is tested for consistency with the measurement models developed from the 
‘buyer only’ and ‘supplier only’ database (n=166, each) (Ambrose, Marshall, and Lynch, 
2010). The adequacy of the measurement model is tested by assessing its convergent and 
discriminant validity. Convergent validity refers to the extent to which indicators of the 
same latent construct converge or share a high proportion of variance in common, while 
discriminant validity refers to the degree to which a latent construct is truly different from 
other latent constructs (Hair, Black, Babin, and Anderson, 2010).
10  Bootstrapping is known to generate the most stable resampling coefficients (and thus the most reliable 
p-values) with larger samples (greater than 100), where the data points are evenly distributed on a scatter plot 
(Kock, 2012). 
11  Jackknifing is known to generate the most stable resampling coefficients (and thus the most reliable 
p-values) with smaller samples (lower than 100), and with samples containing outliers (Kock, 2012).
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Table 4.1 shows the assessment of the convergent validity of the final measurement 
model for all database configurations, and for reflective scales only. Since the indicators 
of formative scales are not necessarily related to each other, and are assumed to be error 
free (Hair et al., 2011), testing the convergent validity of formative scales requires a 
different approach. 
First the indicator reliability is assessed. All indicator loadings have a p-value lower than 
0.001 (not included in the table), and are equal to or greater than 0.5. Accordingly, the 
indicator measures meet the requirements for acceptable convergent validity, i.e. p-values 
lower than 0.05, and indicator loadings equal to or greater than 0.5 (Hair et al., 2010). 
CONNEC4 had a standardized indicator loading of 0.28 (p = 0.001), and was removed 
from the measurement model.12 Cronbach’s alpha provides an estimate for construct 
reliability, based on indicator inter-correlations. It assumes that all indicators contribute 
equally to overall reliability, and uses equal weights (Henseler, Ringle, and Sinkovics, 2009). 
Composite reliability, on the other hand, includes the actual factor loadings of individual 
indicators (Götz, Liehr-Gobbers, and Krafft, 2010). Henseler et. al. (2009) recommend the 
use of composite reliability in PLS path models. Both reliability coefﬁcients are interpreted 
in the same way. A value equal to or greater than 0.70 is considered satisfactory (Nunnally 
and Bernstein, 1994), whereas a value below 0.60 indicates a lack of reliability. Table 4.1 
shows two Cronbach’s alphas slightly below 0.70, while all other coefficients are 0.70 
or higher. Accordingly, the construct reliability coefficients, and most importantly the 
composite reliability coefficients, show acceptable convergent validity.
For formative scales, convergent validity is measured by assessing the p-values and the 
variance inflation factors (VIF’s) of the indicator weights. Indicator weights with p-values 
lower than 0.05 are considered to be valid items in a formative latent construct. Opposed 
to reflective latent construct indicators, formative latent construct indicators are expected 
to measure different aspects of the same construct, which means that their VIF coefficients 
should be low. Table 4.2 shows all p-values to be lower than the threshold value of 0.05, 
and all VIF’s to be lower than the threshold value of 3.3 (Petter, Straub, and Rai, 2007; 
Cenfetelli and Bassellier, 2009). ACQUIS2 showed an inadequate p-value for all three 
database configurations, and was removed from the measurement model. TRANSF2 and 
TRANSF3 showed inadequate p-values for the ‘supplier-only’ database. To prevent that 
the comparison of the structural models was biased by measurement inconsistencies, we 
removed both items for all database configurations. The remaining indicators adequately 
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incremental learning, while the fourth item relates to radical learning. Accordingly, the remaining items (still) 
capture the theoretical domain of the construct adequately.
100 | Chapter 4 Interfirm absorptive capacity: its dimensions, drivers, and impact on ambidexterity | 101
Table 4.2: Convergent validity of formative scales.
Constructs/indicators: Buyer and Supplier Buyer Supplier
    Indicator p-value: VIF: Indicator p-value: VIF: Indicator p-value: VIF:
     weights:      weights:      weights:    
Acquisition                  
  ACQUIS1 .34 <.001 1.30 .39 <.001 1.29 .36 <.001 1.45
  ACQUIS3 .30 <.001 1.18 .28 <.001 1.12 .28 <.001 1.41
  ACQUIS4 .36 <.001 1.42 .38 <.001 1.45 .33 <.001 1.64
  ACQUIS5 .37 <.001 1.48 .36 <.001 1.36 .34 <.001 1.73
Transformation                  
  TRANSF1 .20 <.001 1.46 .15 <.001 1.42 .21 <.001 1.58
  TRANSF4 .15 <.001 1.24 .14 <.001 1.35 .15 .005 1.25
  TRANSF5 .25 <.001 2.76 .25 <.001 2.72 .23 <.001 2.98
  TRANSF6 .24 <.001 2.40 .26 <.001 2.51 .30 <.001 2.56
  TRANSF7 .23 <.001 1.86 .23 <.001 2.12 .24 <.001 1.73
  TRANSF8 .24 <.001 2.21 .21 <.001 2.61 .23 <.001 2.03
Compatibility                  
  COMPA1 .40 <.001 2.15 .35 <.001 1.95 .45 <.001 2.41
  COMPA2 .43 <.001 2.58 .41 <.001 2.45 .46 <.001 2.77
  COMPA3 .35 <.001 1.44 .39 <.001 1.61 .26 <.001 1.32
Explorative Learning 
Performance                  
  E’PLOR LP1 .27 <.001 2.20 .31 <.001 1.84 .25 <.001 2.81
  E’PLOR LP2 .26 <.001 2.03 .34 <.001 1.74 .24 <.001 2.54
  E’PLOR LP3 .26 <.001 2.10 .29 <.001 1.79 .26 <.001 2.56
  E’PLOR LP4 .24 <.001 2.02 .25 <.001 2.18 .22 <.001 2.10
  E’PLOR LP5 .25 <.001 2.12 .18 .002 2.49 .20 <.001 2.03
Exploitive Learning 
Performance                  
  E’PLOI LP1 .17 <.001 1.43 .17 .002 1.55 .19 <.001 1.37
  E’PLOI LP2 .23 <.001 1.64 .21 .005 1.70 .25 <.001 1.63
  E’PLOI LP3 .23 <.001 1.39 .24 .003 1.41 .25 <.001 1.39
  E’PLOI LP4 .19 <.001 1.44 .19 .019 1.84 .18 <.001 1.32
  E’PLOI LP5 .25 <.001 1.76 .30 .007 1.84 .25 <.001 1.77
  E’PLOI LP6 .25 <.001 1.92 .22 .015 2.42 .19 <.001 1.86
  E’PLOI LP7 .23 <.001 1.44 .23 .002 1.38 .23 <.001 1.59
PACAP (2nd)                  
  ACQUIS .55 <.001 1.71 .51 <.001 1.93 .60 <.001 1.56
  ASSIM .55 <.001 1.71 .56 <.001 1.93 .50 <.001 1.56
RACAP (2nd)                  
  TRANSF .55 <.001 1.78 .53 <.001 1.76 .57 <.001 1.86
  EXPL .55 <.001 1.78 .52 <.001 1.76 .57 <.001 1.86
Ambidexterity (2nd)                  
  E’PLOR LP .56 <.001 1.52 .52 <.001 1.45 .55 <.001 1.60
  E’PLOI LP .56 <.001 1.52 .65 <.001 1.45 .50 <.001 1.60
Note: (2nd) = second-order construct.
Discriminant validity is assessed by comparing the square roots of the average variances 
extracted (AVE) of a specific latent construct with the correlation coefficients of that 
specific construct and the other latent constructs. This method applies for reflective as well 
as for formative scales. Table 4.3a and Table 4.3b show the discriminant validity results 
for the combined database, for first-order and second-order constructs respectively. 
The squared roots of the average variances extracted (AVE) are shown on the diagonal, 
while the off-diagonal coefficients represent the correlation coefficients. For each latent 
construct, the square root of the AVE is higher than any of the correlations involving that 
construct, which reflects discriminant validity (Fornell and Larcker, 1981). All correlation 
coefficients were significant at the 0.05-level (not included in the tables). The ‘buyer only’, 
and ‘supplier only’ databases showed the same statistical patterns.
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The statistics depicted in the previous four tables indicate that the measurement model is 
sufficiently strong to enable interpretation of structural estimates. Furthermore, compared 
to the measurement model of the combined database, the measurement model of the 
‘buyer only’ and ‘supplier only’ database show the same statistically significant indicators 
and constructs. 
4.5.2 Structural model
Structural models were assessed for the ‘buyer only’ and the ‘supplier only’ database 
separately. We decided not to add up or average the respective scores, since analysis 
revealed significant differences between buyer and supplier perceptions on most 
dimensions. Accordingly, the associations between the dimensions may differ as well 
(e.g., Oosterhuis et al., 2013). Table 4.4 presents the results of the Levene’s test and the 
independent sample t-test we conducted. We used the Levene’s test to assess the equality 
of variances of the corresponding dimensions in the two samples. The Levene statistics 
show unequal variances for complementarity, connectedness and idiosyncratic resources, 
with higher variances for the ‘buyer only’ database. Consequently, in our interpretation 
of the t-statistics we had to account for unequal variances for these three dimensions. 
The t-statistics show that contracting and ambidexterity are the only dimensions that are 
equally perceived by both relationship partners. All other dimensions show significant 
higher values for the ‘supplier only’ database, which is reflected in the negative t-values 
of Table 4.4. 
Table 4.4: Paired sample T-test between buyer and supplier scores (see Equation 4.1).
Buyer Supplier t-value: p-value: Levene p-value:
  Mean: St.dev.: Mean: St.dev.:
 (of 
differences)  (2-tailed) statistic: (2-tailed)
Complementarity 5.26 1.01 5.49 .89 -2.22a .027** 3.45 .064*
Compatibility 4.20 1.35 4.57 1.28 -2.55 .011** .35 .557
Connectedness 4.83 1.36 5.12 1.13 -2.14a .033** 6.01 .015**
Idiosyncratic 
Resources 4.45 1.30 4.98 1.14 -3.88
a .000*** 9.09 .003***
Contracting 3.70 1.31 3.86 1.26 -1.07 .288 .04 .837
Relational Norms 5.32 .74 5.56 .87 -2.67 .008*** 2.65 .105
PACAP 4.61 .94 4.88 .87 -2.76 .006*** 2.31 .129
RACAP 4.61 .86 4.93 .79 -3.33 .001*** .11 .745
Ambidexterity 3.85 .98 4.04 1.04 -1.64 .0102 1.17 .280
Note: a = adjusted for unequal variances;*** p ≤ .01;** p ≤ .05;* p ≤ .10.
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4.5.2.1 Direct effects
For both databases model fit indices indicate that our structural model describes reality 
quite well. The average path coefficient (APC) and average R-squared (ARS) of the ‘buyer 
only’ structural model (APC=0.244, p<0.001, and ARS=0.261, p<0.001) and the ‘supplier 
only’ structural model (APC=0.208, p<0.001, and ARS=0.184, p=0.009) are all significant 
at the 0.05-level. The average variance inflation factor (AVIF) for both models is less 
than the threshold of 5.0 (Kock, 2012)(AVIF=1.480 for ‘buyer only’, and AVIF=1.867 for 
‘supplier only’). 
For both databases the standardized path coefficients are presented in Table 4.5, representing 
the hypothesized direct effects between the latent constructs. To assess whether the path 
coefficients differ significantly among both databases, we imported the WarpPLS generated 
path coefficients and standard errorsin the equation derived by Chin (2000),
 
where Pathsample_i represents the path coefficient of sample i (i=1,2), S.E.sample_i the standard 
error of sample i (i=1,2), m the sample size of sample 1, and n the sample size of sample 
2. The associated t- and p-values are depicted in the right-hand columns of Table 4.5. 
The compatibility-to-PACAP effect (p-value=0.007), the contracting-to-RACAP effect 
(p-value=0.088), and the relational norms-to-PACAP effect (p-value= 0.061) show 
significantly different values for both databases, while the compatibility-to-RACAP effect 
(p-value=0.103), the contracting-to-PACAP effect (p-value=0.105), and the relational 
norms-to-RACAP effect (p-value= 0.103) almost reach significance at the 0.10-level. For 
their effect on both dependent variables, connectedness and idiosyncratic resources show 
no significant differences (or almost significant differences) among both databases. All 
significant (and almost significant) t-values show positive signs, which reflect higher path 
coefficients for the ‘buyer-only’ data. 
(Equation 4.1),
Table 4.5: Standardized path coefficients and multi-group analysis results (PLS-SEM).










Complementarity            
  Compatibility .425 <.001*** .324 <.001*** .943 .173
  Connectedness .232 .003*** .326 .032** -.485 .314
  Idiosyncratic .553 <.001*** .473 <.001*** .610 .271
  Contracting .170 .325 .098 .178 .185 .427
  Relational Norms .315 <.001*** .377 <.001*** -.453 .325
  PACAP .219 .002*** .164 .042** .461 .323
  RACAP .142 .021** .116 .125 .215 .415
Compatibility            
  PACAP .069 .152 -.184 .009*** 2.486 .007***
  RACAP .184 .014** -.114 .303 1.269 .103
Connectedness            
  PACAP .240 <.001*** .185 .036** .448 .327
  RACAP .285 <.001*** .277 .003*** .064 .474
Idiosyncratic Resources            
  PACAP .158 .020** .177 .127 -.111 .456
  RACAP .109 .064* .238 .049** -.810 .209
Contracting            
  PACAP .111 .064* -.021 .393 1.257 .105
  RACAP .194 .001*** -.022 .441 1.355 .088*
Relational Norms            
  PACAP .299 <.001*** .128 .053* 1.555 .061*
  RACAP .324 <.001*** .177 .023** 1.267 .103
PACAP            
  Ambidexterity .355 .002*** .252 .025** .589 .278
RACAP            
  Ambidexterity .251 .019** .305 .007*** -.315 .376
Note: *** p ≤ .01;** p ≤ .05;* p ≤ .10.
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Table 4.6 depicts the explained variance and predictive validity measures of the 
endogenous latent variables, and the full collinearity measures (VIFs) of all latent 
variables. The variance explained (R-square) and the predictive validity (Stone-Geiser 
Q-square) of the endogenous latent variables range from 0.20 to 0.61. The full collinearity 
test “may be seen” as the variance-based SEM equivalent to the common method bias 
test (Lindell and Whitney, 2001) commonly employed in covariance-based SEM (Kock 
and Lynn, 2012: 561). The full collinearity test identifies collinearity-related problems, 
considering predictor-predictor (‘vertical’) collinearity, as well as predictor-antecedent 
(‘lateral’) collinearity. The VIF-values presented in Table 4.6 are all below the threshold of 
3,3, which implicates that in both structural models no severe collinearity (redundancy) 
between measurement constructs exist (Petter et al., 2007; Cenfetelli and Bassellier, 2009, 
Kock and Lynn, 2012), and the models are free from common method  bias (Kock, 2014).
Table 4.6: Full collinarity VIFs, explained variance, and predictive validity measures (PLS-SEM).
  Full collinearity VIFs: Explained variance Predictive validity
      (R-square): (Stone-Geiser Q-square):
  Buyer Supplier Buyer Supplier Buyer Supplier
Compatibility 1.56 1.19 - - - -
Connectedness 1.65 1.74 - - - -
Idiosyncratic 2.09 2.26 - - - -
Contracting 1.30 1.08 - - - -
Relational Norms 1.72 1.52 - - - -
PACAP 2.47 1.95 .502 .196 .503 .195
RACAP 2.91 2.42 .605 .401 .612 .422
Ambidexterity 1.95 1.91 .314 .289 .299 .303
Note: - = not applicable.
4.5.2.2 Indirect/mediation effects         
A simple three-variable path model is diagrammed in Figure 4.2 (Hayes and Preacher, 
2010). X represents the independent variable, Y the dependent variable, and M the 
mediator. In the upper part of the figure the mediator (M) is not included in the structural 
model. Path c represents the total effect between the independent variable (X) and the 
dependent variable (Y). In the lower part the mediator (M) is included. The size of the 
indirect effect is the product of the X-to-M effect (a) and the M-to-Y effect (b). When the 
indirect effect (a x b) equals the total effect (c), the effect of X on Y is completely mediated 
by M. In this case there is no direct effect between X and Y; path c’ is equal to zero. When 
the indirect effect (a x b) is nonzero, and smaller than the total effect (c), the effect of X on 
Y is partially mediated by M. In this case there is a direct effect between X and Y; path c’ 
is greater than zero. 
Figure 4.2: Path diagram mediation.
We performed a two-step PLS-SEM analysis to estimate the hypothesized indirect 
effects between the latent variables for both databases separately. Since WarpPLS3.0 only 
estimates the total indirect effect and its associated p-value, a second step was necessary to 
estimate the p-value of the mediation effect of each mediator separately. Without altering 
the coefficients of the structural model, we isolated the mediation effect of each mediator 
one at a time, by deleting the X-to-M links of the four other mediators. The results of the 
mediation analysis are shown in Table 4.7a (‘buyer-only’) and Table 4.7b (‘supplier-only’). 
The estimated strength of mediation (m) was calculated by dividing the estimated indirect 
effect ( x ) by the estimated total effect () (Shrout and Bolger, 2002). 
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We performed a two-step PLS-SEM analysis to estimate the hypothesized indirect 
effects between the latent variables for both databases separately. Since WarpPLS3.0 only 
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the coefficients of the structural model, we isolated the mediation effect of each mediator 
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The estimated strength of mediation (m) was calculated by dividing the estimated indirect 
effect ( x ) by the estimated total effect () (Shrout and Bolger, 2002). 
108 | Chapter 4 Interfirm absorptive capacity: its dimensions, drivers, and impact on ambidexterity | 109




mediation effect:                            Standardized Coefficients (p-values):
Effect proportion 
mediated:
c^ (ab^ c^ P^m
PACAP   .504 (<.001)***        
  M(combined)       .285 (<.001)***   .219 (.002)*** .565
  M(compatibility)       .029 (.161)     .058
  M(connectedness)     .056 (.014)**     .111
  M(idiosyncratic resources)     .087 (.023)**     .173
  M(contracting)       .019 (.333)     .038
  M(relational norms)     .094 (.003)***     .187
RACAP   .482 (<.001)***        
  M(combined)       .340 (<.001)***   .142 (.021)** .705
  M(compatibility)       .078 (.028)**     .162
  M(connectedness)     .066 (.016)**     .137
  M(idiosyncratic resources)     .060 (.067)*     .124
  M(contracting)       .033 (.331)     .068
  M(relational norms)       .102 (.002)***     .212
Note: p-values in parentheses (*** p ≤ .01;** p ≤ .05;* p ≤ .10).




mediation effect:                            Standardized Coefficients (p-values):
Effect proportion 
mediated:
c^ (ab^ c^ P^m
PACAP   .295 (<.001)***        
  M(combined)       .131(.047)**   .164 (.042)** .444
  M(compatibility)       -.060 (.027)**     -.203
  M(connectedness)     .061 (.101)     .207
  M(idiosyncratic resources)     .084 (.125)     .285
  M(contracting)       -.002 (.395)     -.007
  M(relational norms)     .048 (.077)*     .163
RACAP   .347 (.016)**        
  M(combined)       .231(.016)**   .116 (.125) .666
  M(compatibility)       -.037 (.302)     -.107
  M(connectedness)     .091 (.068)*     .262
  M(idiosyncratic resources)     .113 (.037)**     .326
  M(contracting)       -.002 (.438)     -.006
  M(relational norms)       .067 (.043)**     .193
Note: p-values in parentheses (*** p ≤ .01;** p ≤ .05;* p ≤ .10).
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4.5.3 Hypotheses testing
To test our hypotheses, we have to take into consideration the estimated direct effects, the 
estimated indirect effects (when mediation is hypothesized), and the shape of the partial 
relations (when nonlinearity is hypothesized). First, we discuss the results depicted by the 
left part of Table 4.5 (the direct effects) and Table 4.7a (the indirect effects), which refer to 
the ‘buyer only’ data. Second, we discuss the results presented in the middle part of Table 
4.5 (the direct effects) and Table 4.7b (the indirect effects), which refer to the ‘supplier 
only’ data. When nonlinearity is hypothesized, we refer to the graphs presented in Figure 
4.3. In all occasions WarpPLS software showed “warped” relationships, indicating that all 
graphed relationships clearly show nonlinearity (Kock, 2012).
Next, we check the robustness of the outcomes of the mediation analysis by performing 
two additional tests. First, we apply the method developed by Hayes and Preacher (2010), 
using the WarpPLS generated path coefficients and standard errors. Next, applying Baron 
and Kenny’s (1986) method, we estimate the mediation effects using coefficients generated 
by ordinary least squares (OLS). 
4.5.3.1 ‘Buyer-only’ database
Hypotheses 1a and 1b were tested taking into consideration the total effect (), the 
indirect (x) and the direct effect () of complementarity on PACAP and RACAP. Table 
4.7a depicts a positive total effect between complementarity and PACAP (=0.504, 
p<0.001), and complementarity and RACAP (=0.482, p<0.001). Furthermore, Table 4.7a 
shows a significant (combined) indirect and direct effect for PACAP (x=0.285, p<0.001, 
and =0.219, p=0.002), as well as for RACAP (x=0.340, p<0.001, and =0.142, p=0.021). 
From this we conclude that the effect of complementarity on PACAP and RACAP is 
partially mediated by the combined effect of compatibility, connectedness, idiosyncratic 
resources, contracting and relational norms. The estimated strength of mediation (m) is 
0.565 for PACAP, and 0.705 for RACAP. From this we conclude that H1a(1,2) and H1b(1,2) 
are fully supported.
To test our hypotheses 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 we have to assess the X-to-M effect , and the 
M-to-Y effect  (both Table 4.5) for all mediators separately. The p-value associated with 
the indirect effect  x  is depicted in Table 4.7a. Compatibility significantly mediates the 
relationship between complementarity and RACAP (x=0.078, p=0.028), but not between 
complementarity and PACAP (x=0.029, p=0.161). As expected, complementarity 
positively affects compatibility (=0.425, p<0.001). Contrary to expectations, compatibility 
is not significantly related to PACAP (=0.069, p=0.152), but is positively related to RACAP 
(=0.184, p=0.014). Hence, the data indicate a lack of support for H2a(1,3), and support for 
H2a(2) and H2b(1,2,3).
The effect of complementarity on PACAP and RACAP is significantly mediated by 
connectedness (x=0.056, p=0.014, and x=0.066, p=0.016, respectively). Furthermore, 
complementarity positively affects connectedness (=0.232, p=0.003) while connectedness 
positively affects PACAP (=0.240, p<0.001) and RACAP (=0.285, p<0.001). The graph 
that shows the partial relation between connectedness and PACAP (Figure 4.3a) however, 
shows an inverted U-shaped relationship instead of the expected non-linear degressive 
curve. Hence, higher levels of connectedness not only level off the increase in PACAP, but 
- after a critical point - also decrease the value of PACAP. As a result, the data indicate a 
lack of support for H3a(4), and support for H3a(1,2,3) and H3b(1,2,3). 
Figure 4.3: Graphs of hypothesized nonlineair relationships.
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The effect of complementarity on PACAP is significantly mediated by idiosyncratic 
resources (x=0.087, p=0.023). At the significance level of 0.10, the effect of complementarity 
on RACAP is also mediated by idiosyncratic resources (x=0.060, p=0.067). For the link 
between idiosyncratic resources and the dependent variables we find similar results. 
Idiosyncratic resources is significantly related to PACAP (=0.158, p=0.020), and at the 
0.10-level to RACAP (=0.109, p=0.064). Furthermore, complementarity is significantly 
related to idiosyncratic resources (=0.553, p<0.001), hence H4a(1,2,3) and H4b(1,2,3) 
are fully supported.
Contrary to expectations the effect of complementarity on PACAP is not mediated by 
contracting (x=0.019, p=0.333). The same is true for the effect of complementarity on 
RACAP (x=0.033, p=0.331). Furthermore, complementarity is not significantly related 
to contracting (=0.170, p=0.325). Contracting, however, is positively related to RACAP 
(=0.194, p=0.001). At the 0.10-level contracting is also related to PACAP (=0.111, 
p=0.064), but the path coefficient does not show the expected negative sign. As a result 
H5b(3) is supported, and H5a(1,2,3) and H5b(1,2) are not supported by the data.
H6a(1,2,3,4) and H6b(1,2,3,4) are fully supported. The effect of complementarity on PACAP and 
RACAP is significantly mediated by relational norms (x=0.094, p=0.003, and x=0.102, 
p=0.002, respectively). Complementarity positively affects relational norms (=0.315, 
p<0.001), while relational norms is positively related to PACAP and RACAP (=0.299, 
p<0.001, and =0.324, p<0.001, respectively). Furthermore, the graphs show the nonlinear 
degressive shape that was hypothesized (Figures 4.3b and 4.3c).
Finally, Table 4.5 indicates that PACAP (beta=0.355, p=0.002) and RACAP (beta=0.251, 
p=0.019) are positively related to ambidexterity, thereby supporting H7a(1) and H7b(1). The 
results of the ‘buyer only’ database are summarized in Table 4.8a. 
Table 4.8a: Overview of (supported and rejected) hypotheses (PLS-SEM)(‘buyer-only’)
Dependent Hypothesis: Buyer









PACAP            
  Complementarity H1a sup. sup.** - - -
  Compatibility H2a rej. - sup. rej. -
  Connectedness H3a sup. - sup. sup. rej.
  Idiosyncratic H4a sup. - sup. sup. -
  Contracting H5a rej. - rej. rej. -
  Relational Norms H6a sup. - sup. sup. sup.
RACAP            
  Complementarity H1b sup. sup.** - - -
  Compatibility H2b sup. - sup. sup. -
  Connectedness H3b sup. - sup. sup. -
  Idiosyncratic H4b sup. - sup. sup. -
  Contracting H5b rej. - rej. sup. -
  Relational Norms H6b sup. - sup. sup. sup.
Ambidexterity            
  PACAP H7a - sup.* - - -
  RACAP H7b - sup.* - - -
Note: sup. = supported; rej. = rejected; - = not applicable .
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4.5.3.2 ‘Supplier-only’ database   
Table 4.7b reveals a positive total effect between complementarity and PACAP (=0.295, 
p<0.001) and complementarity and RACAP (=0.347, p=0.016). The indirect effect of 
complementarity on PACAP and RACAP is significant at the 0.05-level (x=0.131, p=0.047, 
and x=0.231, p=0.016, respectively). Results further indicate that while the direct effect of 
complementarity on PACAP is statistically significant (=0.164, p=0.042), the direct effect 
of complementarity on RACAP is not (=0.116, p=0.125). As a consequence, the effect of 
complementarity on PACAP is partially mediated, and the effect of complementarity on 
RACAP is completely mediated by the combined effect of compatibility, connectedness, 
idiosyncratic resources, contracting and relational norms. The estimated strength of 
mediation (m) is 0.444 for PACAP, and 0.666 for RACAP. Accordingly, H1a(1,2) and H1b(1,2) 
are fully supported.
Looking at the effects of the individual mediators, compatibility significantly mediates the 
relationship between complementarity and PACAP (x=-0.600, p=0.027), but not between 
complementarity and RACAP (x=-0.037, p=0.302). Complementarity positively affects 
compatibility (=0.324, p<0.001).  Furthermore, compatibility is significantly related to 
PACAP (=-0.184, p=0.009), but the path coefficient does not show the expected positive 
sign, and compatibility does not affect RACAP (=-0.114, p=0.303). Hence, the data 
indicate support for H2a(1,2) and H2b(2), and a lack of support for H2a(3) and H2b(1,3). 
Opposed to the effect of complementarity on PACAP, the effect of complementarity 
on RACAP is significantly mediated by connectedness, at the significance level of 0.10 
(x=0.061, p=0.101, and x=0.091, p=0.068, respectively). Furthermore, complementarity is 
positively related to connectedness (=0.326, p=0.032) and the results reflect connectedness 
to significantly affect PACAP and RACAP (=0.185, p=0.036, and =0.277, p=0.003, 
respectively). Instead of the expected non-linear degressive shape, the graph depicting the 
partial relation between connectedness and PACAP shows an S-curve (Figure 4.3d). Closer 
visual inspection reveals that this may be due to outliers at the left-hand and right-hand 
side of the graph. For the range between -2 and +2 standard deviations from the mean - 
the range that represents more than 96% of the observations - the graph approximates the 
expected curve. Hence, H3a(2,3,4) and H3b(1,2,3) are supported by the data, while H3a(1) is not.
The effect of complementarity on PACAP is not mediated by idiosyncratic resources 
(x=0.084, p=0.125), but the effect of complementarity on RACAP is (x=0.113, 
p=0.037). Likewise, idiosyncratic resources is not related to PACAP (=0.177, p=0.127), 
but is related to RACAP (=0.238, p=0.049). Complementarity is positively related to 
idiosyncratic resources (=0.473, p<0.001). As a result H4a(1,3) are rejected, while H4a(2) and 
H4b(1,2,3) are supported. 
Neither the effect of complementarity on PACAP, nor the effect of complementarity 
on RACAP is mediated by contracting (x=-0.002, p=0.395, and x=-0.002, p=0.438, 
respectively). Furthermore, there is no significant relationship between complementarity 
and contracting (=0.098, p=0.178). Also the relationship between contracting and PACAP 
(=-0.021, p=0.393) and contracting and RACAP (=-0.022, p=0.441) fail to support 
H5(1,2,3) and H5b(1,2,3).
At the significance level of 0.10 relational norms mediates the effect of complementarity on 
PACAP (x=0.048, p=0.077). Relational norms also mediates the effect of complementarity 
on RACAP (x=0.002, p=0.043). Complementarity positively affects relational norms 
(=0.377, p<0.001). Furthermore, at the 0.10-level, relational norms is related to PACAP 
(=0.128, p=0.053). Relational norms is also related to RACAP (=0.177, p=0.023). Both 
graphs that depict the partial relation between relational norms and the dependent 
variables, however, show an inverted U-shaped curve, instead of the expected nonlinear 
degressive curve (Figures 4.3e and 4.3f). Closer visual inspection reveals again that this 
may be due to outliers in the ‘supplier-only’ database. For the range between -2 and +2 
standard deviations from the mean - the range that represents more than 97% of the 
observations - the graphs approximate the expected curve. Accordingly, H6a(1,2,3,4) and 
H6b(1,2,3,4) are fully supported by the data.
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PACAP            
  Complementarity H1a sup. sup.** - - -
  Compatibility H2a sup. - sup. rej. -
  Connectedness H3a rej. - sup. sup. sup.
  Idiosyncratic H4a rej. - sup. rej. -
  Contracting H5a rej. - rej. rej. -
  Relational Norms H6a sup. - sup. sup. sup.
RACAP            
  Complementarity H1b sup. sup.** - - -
  Compatibility H2b rej. - sup. rej. -
  Connectedness H3b sup. - sup. sup. -
  Idiosyncratic H4b sup. - sup. sup. -
  Contracting H5b rej. - rej. rej. -
  Relational Norms H6b sup. - sup. sup. sup.
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variables, however, show an inverted U-shaped curve, instead of the expected nonlinear 
degressive curve (Figures 4.3e and 4.3f). Closer visual inspection reveals again that this 
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Finally, PACAP (beta=0.252, p=0.025) and RACAP (beta=0.305, p=0.007) are positively 
related to ambidexterity, thereby supporting H7a(1) and H7b(1). The results of the ‘supplier 
only’ database are summarized in Table 4.8b. 
4.5.3.3 Robustness check 
To test the robustness of the outcomes of the mediation analysis we performed an 
additional test. This test is an alternative for the method we used to assess mediation effects, 
which was based on the estimation of indirect effects and related p-values calculated 
by the WarpPLS software. The main advantage of the method we applied so far is that 
through resampling the indirect effects, a direct estimation of the p-values associated 
with the mediation effects is allowed for. As a robustness check we applied the method 
developed by Hayes and Preacher (2010) (see Appendix 4.2) and estimated the mediation 
effects utilizing the path coefficients and standard errors generated by WarpPLS. This 
method uses standard errors to estimate p-values for ’, , , and  (see Figure 4.2), but do not 
provide standard errors to estimate p-values for x (the indirect effect). Instead, Hayes and 
Preacher’s method contains “an approximate expression” (Shrout and Bolger, 2002: 425), 
derived by Sobel, to estimate the standard error for mediating effects. 
From Table 4.A2 (Appendix 4.2) we can conclude that the results of the robustness 
check are almost identical to the indirect effect estimates of Table 4.7, which makes these 
estimates stable outcomes. 
4.6 DISCUSSION
Our discussion section is organized as follows. First we highlight and discuss the most 
revealing outcomes of the empirical study. Again, for direct effects we refer to the estimates 
presented in Table 4.5, and for indirect effects we refer to the estimates presented in Tables 
4.7a and 4.7b. Next we reflect on the aims of our study and discuss the scientific and 
managerial implications. We conclude with a discussion of the limitations and directions 
for future research.
4.6.1 Summary and discussion of the empirical study
4.6.1.1 Complementarity
As proposed, the complementarity between both partners provides the potential for 
interfirm learning, but it is the quality of the relationship that defines the realization of 
this potential. The buyer and supplier data reveal that the effect of complementarity on 
PACAP and RACAP is at least partially mediated by the combined effect of compatibility, 
connectedness, idiosyncratic resources, contracting, and relational norms. The combined 
effect measures (see Tables 4.7a and 4.7b) are statistically significant for both ACAP 
dimensions and both databases. This causes quite substantial estimated strength of 
mediation measures (m) (see Tables 4.7a and 4.7b). However, compared to the other  m 
measures (0.565, 0.705, and 0.666), the m measure related to PACAP and the ‘supplier-
only’ database is relatively low (0.444). This is caused by suppression. Suppression occurs 
when the  indirect effect has the opposite sign of the direct effect (Shrout and Bolger, 
2002). In our study compatibility shows a significant negative indirect effect on the relation 
between complementarity and PACAP, which is opposite to the positive total effect of 
complementarity on PACAP. Due to the estimated negative indirect effect of compatibility, 
the combined effect of the mediators is considerably lower (x=0.131) compared to the 
imaginary situation in which compatibility would have shown a positive indirect effect of 
the same size (x=0.251). 
4.6.1.2 Compatibility
As far as the direct and mediating effects of compatibility are concerned, we found mixed 
results. Compatibility significantly mediates the effect of complementarity on PACAP, 
but only for the supplier data. The buyer data show an insignificant indirect effect ( x ), 
which most likely is due to the insignificance of the direct effect between compatibility 
and PACAP (), since the outcomes in Table 4.5 show a significant complementarity-to-
compatibility effect (). The insignificant direct effect can be explained by a dual influence 
compatibility may have on PACAP. First, but not necessarily foremost, similar systems 
and cultures facilitate coordinated action and serve as a means for behavior control and 
expectation management, which facilitates PACAP. Second, similar systems and cultures 
are not at odds with the basic characteristics of explorative learning (i.e. search, discovery, 
risk taking, experimentation, variance-increasing activities, amongst others), which may 
hinder the explorative capabilities of the relationship, and thus impede PACAP (e.g., 
Leonard-Barton, 1992; Azadegan, Dooley, Carter, and Carter, 2008). Leaning too heavily 
on the former influence, we expected to see a positive effect between compatibility and 
PACAP, thereby disregarding the effect of the latter. The same argument may apply to the 
negative compatibility-to-PACAP effect we estimated from the supplier data , where a 
positive effect was hypothesized.
Additionally, compatibility significantly mediates the effect of complementarity on 
RACAP, but only for the buyer data. The ‘supplier-only’ database shows an insignificant 
indirect effect ( x ), which is likely to be caused by the insignificance of the direct effect 
between compatibility and RACAP (), since the data show a significant complementarity-
to-compatibility effects () for both databases. To find a plausible reason why the buyer 
data do support the hypothesized compatibility-to-RACAP effect, while the supplier data 
do not, we have to bear in mind RACAP’s association with exploitative learning, and 
the different market perspectives of both partners. The supplier will predominantly be 
focused on the supplier market, while the buyer will predominantly be focused on the 
buyer market (Tuli, Kohli, and Bharadwaj, 2007). Since by definition the buyer market is 
comparatively closer to the consumer end market, in general the buyer will be more end 
market driven than the supplier. As a result, from the buyers’ perspective the alignment 
of both partners may be more important for exploitation, especially in turbulent markets, 
since alignment allows for adjustments to the requirements of the consumer end market. 
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interfirm learning, but it is the quality of the relationship that defines the realization of 
this potential. The buyer and supplier data reveal that the effect of complementarity on 
PACAP and RACAP is at least partially mediated by the combined effect of compatibility, 
connectedness, idiosyncratic resources, contracting, and relational norms. The combined 
effect measures (see Tables 4.7a and 4.7b) are statistically significant for both ACAP 
dimensions and both databases. This causes quite substantial estimated strength of 
mediation measures (m) (see Tables 4.7a and 4.7b). However, compared to the other  m 
measures (0.565, 0.705, and 0.666), the m measure related to PACAP and the ‘supplier-
only’ database is relatively low (0.444). This is caused by suppression. Suppression occurs 
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imaginary situation in which compatibility would have shown a positive indirect effect of 
the same size (x=0.251). 
4.6.1.2 Compatibility
As far as the direct and mediating effects of compatibility are concerned, we found mixed 
results. Compatibility significantly mediates the effect of complementarity on PACAP, 
but only for the supplier data. The buyer data show an insignificant indirect effect ( x ), 
which most likely is due to the insignificance of the direct effect between compatibility 
and PACAP (), since the outcomes in Table 4.5 show a significant complementarity-to-
compatibility effect (). The insignificant direct effect can be explained by a dual influence 
compatibility may have on PACAP. First, but not necessarily foremost, similar systems 
and cultures facilitate coordinated action and serve as a means for behavior control and 
expectation management, which facilitates PACAP. Second, similar systems and cultures 
are not at odds with the basic characteristics of explorative learning (i.e. search, discovery, 
risk taking, experimentation, variance-increasing activities, amongst others), which may 
hinder the explorative capabilities of the relationship, and thus impede PACAP (e.g., 
Leonard-Barton, 1992; Azadegan, Dooley, Carter, and Carter, 2008). Leaning too heavily 
on the former influence, we expected to see a positive effect between compatibility and 
PACAP, thereby disregarding the effect of the latter. The same argument may apply to the 
negative compatibility-to-PACAP effect we estimated from the supplier data , where a 
positive effect was hypothesized.
Additionally, compatibility significantly mediates the effect of complementarity on 
RACAP, but only for the buyer data. The ‘supplier-only’ database shows an insignificant 
indirect effect ( x ), which is likely to be caused by the insignificance of the direct effect 
between compatibility and RACAP (), since the data show a significant complementarity-
to-compatibility effects () for both databases. To find a plausible reason why the buyer 
data do support the hypothesized compatibility-to-RACAP effect, while the supplier data 
do not, we have to bear in mind RACAP’s association with exploitative learning, and 
the different market perspectives of both partners. The supplier will predominantly be 
focused on the supplier market, while the buyer will predominantly be focused on the 
buyer market (Tuli, Kohli, and Bharadwaj, 2007). Since by definition the buyer market is 
comparatively closer to the consumer end market, in general the buyer will be more end 
market driven than the supplier. As a result, from the buyers’ perspective the alignment 
of both partners may be more important for exploitation, especially in turbulent markets, 
since alignment allows for adjustments to the requirements of the consumer end market. 
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4.6.1.3 Connectedness
The hypothesized mediation and positive direct effects of connectedness are supported by 
the data, with the exception of the ‘supplier-only’ estimated mediation effect regarding the 
relation between complementarity and PACAP. The associated PLS-SEM indirect effect 
( x ) is insignificant, though close to significance (p=0.101), while the complementarity-
to-connectedness effect (), and the effect of connectedness on PACAP () both are 
statistically significant. 
‘Supplier-only’ post-hoc analysis on the individual dimensions of PACAP reveals 
that the effect of connectedness on assimilation is statistically significant, while 
the connectedness-to-acquisition effect is not. Hence, the insignificant (but almost 
significant) mediation effect of connectedness is likely to be caused by the insignificance 
of the relation between connectedness and acquisition. The insignificant direct effect of 
connectedness on acquisition can be explained by the intrinsic nature of the acquisition 
dimension. Integrating the dynamic capability view of ACAP with insights from 
organizational learning, Sun and Anderson’s conceptualization of acquisition is linked to 
“the cyclical process of intuition and interpretation” (2010: 143). “Once intuition occurs 
at the individual-level, it needs to be interpreted at the group-level”(ibid.), and “once 
language is described to the initial intuition, it can further hone or refine external search.” 
(ibid.). Since assimilation only involves interpretation, which basically is a group-level 
learning activity, connectedness will be positively related to assimilation. The relation 
between connectedness and acquisition, however, will be less straightforward, since 
acquisition also involves intuition, which is an individual-level learning activity that does 
not require connectedness. 
A final remark about the hypothesized effects of connectedness concerns the expected 
positive relation between connectedness and PACAP that is supposed to level off at 
higher levels of connectedness due to redundancy of information and limited access to 
divergent perspectives. In the -2 and +2 standard deviations range, Figure 4.3d (‘supplier-
only’) approximates the expected curve, but Figure 4.3a (‘buyer-only’) depicts an inverted 
U-shape. The inverted U-shape implies that higher levels of connectedness not only level 
off the increase in PACAP, but after a critical point also decrease the level of PACAP. 
Accordingly, for the ‘buyer-only’ database the impeding effects of collective blindness at 
higher levels of connectedness (see section 4.3.3) may be more severe than we expected. 
4.6.1.4 Idiosyncratic resources
Through the process of integrating complementary resources, idiosyncratic resources 
allow the buyer-supplier relationship to extract the learning potential offered by the 
complementarity between both partners and thus synergistic effects may occur (see section 
4.3.4). The buyer data confirm the hypothesized mediation and direct effects. The supplier 
data show the hypothesized mediation and direct effect for RACAP, but not for PACAP. 
It may be that the insignificant direct effect of idiosyncratic resources on PACAP can 
be explained by the greater heterogeneity of the supplier database. As described in our 
method section we selected the suppliers following a 2x2-design, with relationship duration 
greater or less than two years on the one dimension, and moderate or crucial importance 
of the relationship (as perceived by the buyer) on the other dimension. Although, because 
of the matched-pair methodology, the ‘buyer only’ database in principle will contain the 
same diversity of relationships, due to the one-buyer-multiple-suppliers ratio the supplier 
database will be more heterogeneous. Additionally, we restricted our buyer selection to 
six preselected industries, while the supplier selection was not restricted by industry. 
Furthermore, all buyers share the Dutch nationality, while the suppliers may have different 
nationalities and different cultures. 
Due to heterogeneity, some suppliers may invest in idiosyncratic resources mainly 
to improve the explorative capability of the relationship, while others may invest 
in idiosyncratic resources with the primary purpose to signal commitment to the 
relationship (Anderson and Weitz, 1992; Leuthesser, 1997; Jap, 2001), or to be safeguarded 
from opportunistic behavior of their counterpart (Williamson, 1985; Anderson and 
Weitz, 1992). Accordingly, for several reasons suppliers may have invested substantially 
in idiosyncratic resources, showing a higher mean and less dispersed values compared to 
their relationship counterpart (the buyer). Our findings support this view (see Table 4.4). 
4.6.1.5 Contracting
For both dependent variables (PACAP and RACAP), and for both databases (‘buyer 
only’ and ‘supplier only’) we find no evidence for the mediating effect of contracting. 
Furthermore, the direct effect of contracting on the dependent variables shows significance 
for the ‘buyer-only’ database, but not for the ‘supplier-only’ database. The hypothesized 
’buyer-only’ direct effect between contracting and PACAP, however,  is not supported, 
since the path coefficient shows the wrong sign. 
Our findings are in accordance with Macneil’s (1980) assertion that formal contracts do 
not play an important role in most relationships. The implicit terms and understandings 
of the relationship instead of the explicit terms of the contract determine how actors 
behave. Likewise Williamson (1985) argued that due to opportunism, bounded rationality 
and environmental uncertainty, complex contingent claim contracting may not always be 
feasible. Consequently, formal contracting will not play an important role in long-term 
relationships, and social mechanisms may offer the flexibility for the adjustments that 
are needed (ibid.). Moreover, as mentioned in section 4.3.6, previous work reveals that 
although formal contracting may be highly effective when information is highly explicit 
and uncertainty is low, informal controls will be more effective when information is 
ambiguous and organizationally embedded, and uncertainty is high (Makhija and Ganesh, 
1997; Cannon et al., 2000; Uzzi and Lancaster, 2003; Inkpen and Curall, 2004). 
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Through the process of integrating complementary resources, idiosyncratic resources 
allow the buyer-supplier relationship to extract the learning potential offered by the 
complementarity between both partners and thus synergistic effects may occur (see section 
4.3.4). The buyer data confirm the hypothesized mediation and direct effects. The supplier 
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greater or less than two years on the one dimension, and moderate or crucial importance 
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of the matched-pair methodology, the ‘buyer only’ database in principle will contain the 
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For both dependent variables (PACAP and RACAP), and for both databases (‘buyer 
only’ and ‘supplier only’) we find no evidence for the mediating effect of contracting. 
Furthermore, the direct effect of contracting on the dependent variables shows significance 
for the ‘buyer-only’ database, but not for the ‘supplier-only’ database. The hypothesized 
’buyer-only’ direct effect between contracting and PACAP, however,  is not supported, 
since the path coefficient shows the wrong sign. 
Our findings are in accordance with Macneil’s (1980) assertion that formal contracts do 
not play an important role in most relationships. The implicit terms and understandings 
of the relationship instead of the explicit terms of the contract determine how actors 
behave. Likewise Williamson (1985) argued that due to opportunism, bounded rationality 
and environmental uncertainty, complex contingent claim contracting may not always be 
feasible. Consequently, formal contracting will not play an important role in long-term 
relationships, and social mechanisms may offer the flexibility for the adjustments that 
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and uncertainty is low, informal controls will be more effective when information is 
ambiguous and organizationally embedded, and uncertainty is high (Makhija and Ganesh, 
1997; Cannon et al., 2000; Uzzi and Lancaster, 2003; Inkpen and Curall, 2004). 
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As stated  by Dyer and Singh, effective governance mechanisms “will lower transaction 
costs or permit the realization of rents through the synergistic combination of assets, 
knowledge or capabilities” (1998: 662). For now we conclude that from a transaction 
cost economics point of view there are no obvious reasons to assume that contracting 
alone works beneficially for long-term relationships.  Furthermore, only from the buyer’s 
perspective, contracting may lead to higher levels of transparency and to more structured 
and refined procedures, thereby reducing trivial and repetitive informal flows (Noordhoff 
et al., 2011), which in their turn may enhance the explorative and exploitative capabilities 
of the relationship. 
4.6.1.6 Relational norms
As hypothesized and as expected from the previous discussion, we find evidence for the 
mediating effects and the positive direct effects of relational norms for both dependent 
variables and databases. Additionally, in the range between -2 and +2 standard deviations 
from the mean, the graphs representing the relation between relational norms and the 
dependent variables approximate the expected curve. From this we can conclude that in 
order to be effective governance modes for long-term buyer-supplier relationships should 
neither  be too strict (like in detailed contracting), nor too lose (like in higher levels of 
relational norms). 
4.6.1.7 Ambidexterity
Ambidexterity refers to the ability of the relationship to simultaneously explore and exploit 
(see section 4.2.1). The PLS-SEM findings show a positive PACAP-to-ambidexterity effect, 
and a positive RACAP-to-ambidexterity effect for the ‘buyer-only’ database, as well as for 
the ‘supplier-only’ database. These effects confirm the importance of our prior findings. 
Furthermore,  it confirms the nomological validity of the ACAP construct we developed 
for this study.
4.6.2 The scientific and managerial implications of our findings
The aim of this study was to advance the understanding of interfirm ACAP, its underlying 
dimensions, its drivers, and its impact on ambidexterity. We empirically investigated 
the relationship between buyer and supplier from the perspective of both partners. We 
explicitly took the multidimensionality of the ACAP construct into account by making 
the distinction between potential absorptive capacity (PACAP) and realized absorptive 
capacity (RACAP). PACAP contains the capabilities of the relationship to acquire and 
assimilate external knowledge, and corresponds to explorative learning. RACAP refers to 
the capabilities of the relationship to transform and exploit assimilated knowledge, and 
corresponds to exploitative learning. To enhance long-term competitiveness it is necessary 
to foster explorative and exploitative learning simultaneously. Both learning types require 
fundamentally different and inconsistent architectures and competencies. By conceiving 
interfirm ACAP as a dynamic capability, we determined the effect of PACAP and RACAP 
on a variable that measures the explorative and exploitative learning performance of the 
relationship, viz. (contextual) ambidexterity. 
The resource-based view (RBV) proclaims that interfirm relationships will generate 
competitive advantages only as they move away from the attributes of an arm’s-length 
relationship. Accordingly,  we determined that (1) relation-specific assets, (2) knowledge-
sharing routines, (3) complementary resources and capabilities, and (4) effective 
governance are the drivers of PACAP and RACAP. We proposed that the complementarity 
between both partners provides the potential for explorative and exploitative interfirm 
learning. It is the quality of the complementary relationship however that enables the 
realization of this potential. Hence we developed and empirically tested a model in which 
complementarity is the antecedent of interfirm ACAP, while compatibility, connectedness, 
idiosyncratic resources, contracting and relational norms are the generative mechanisms 
that mediate the relationship between knowledge complementarity and interfirm ACAP.
Our results indicate that the effect of complementarity on ACAP is at least partially 
mediated by the other determinants of relational rents (viz. compatibility, connectedness, 
idiosyncratic resources, contracting and relational norms), but not by all. In all cases we 
find mediating effects for relational norms, and no mediating effects for contracting. Which 
of the remaining determinants serve as a mediator seems to be conditioned by the focal 
dimension of ACAP (PACAP or RACAP), and the characteristics of the database (‘buyer-
only’ or ‘supplier-only’). From the buyer’s perspective connectedness and idiosyncratic 
resources mediate the relation between complementarity and PACAP, but compatibility 
does not. Also from the buyer’s perspective connectedness and idiosyncratic resources, 
but also compatibility mediate the relation between complementarity and RACAP.  From 
the supplier’s perspective connectedness and idiosyncratic resources do not mediate 
the relation between complementarity and PACAP, but compatibility does. Also from 
the supplier’s perspective, but now considering RACAP, we find the opposite results; 
connectedness and idiosyncratic resources mediate the relation between complementarity 
and RACAP, and compatibility does not. 
Moreover, our findings reveal that from both partners’ perspective connectedness and 
relational norms show  positive direct effects on both ACAP dimensions. Again, the 
remaining direct effects seem to be conditioned by the focal dimension of ACAP and the 
characteristics of the database.  First, from the supplier’s perspective complementarity 
is positively related to PACAP but does not show a significant direct effect on RACAP, 
while from the buyer’s perspective complementarity is positively related to both ACAP 
dimensions. Second, from the buyer’s perspective compatibility is positively related to 
RACAP, but does not show a significant effect on PACAP, while the supplier’s perspective 
shows a negative direct effect between compatibility and PACAP, and no significant effect 
between compatibility and RACAP. Third, from the buyer’s perspective idiosyncratic 
resources is directly and positively linked to PACAP and RACAP, but from the supplier’s 
perspective only a (positive) direct link exists between idiosyncratic resources and RACAP. 
Fourth, only from the buyer’s perspective contracting is positively related to PACAP and 
RACAP; from the supplier’s perspective no significant relation exists between contracting 
and both ACAP dimensions.
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dimensions. Second, from the buyer’s perspective compatibility is positively related to 
RACAP, but does not show a significant effect on PACAP, while the supplier’s perspective 
shows a negative direct effect between compatibility and PACAP, and no significant effect 
between compatibility and RACAP. Third, from the buyer’s perspective idiosyncratic 
resources is directly and positively linked to PACAP and RACAP, but from the supplier’s 
perspective only a (positive) direct link exists between idiosyncratic resources and RACAP. 
Fourth, only from the buyer’s perspective contracting is positively related to PACAP and 
RACAP; from the supplier’s perspective no significant relation exists between contracting 
and both ACAP dimensions.
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Hence, except for the mediating effect of relational norms and contracting, and the direct 
effect of connectedness and relational norms, the remaining mediating and direct effects 
are conditioned by the focal dimension of ACAP, and the supplier versus buyer database. 
These outcomes have important theoretical and managerial implications, since from both 
relationship partners’ perspective PACAP and RACAP were found to be positively related 
to ambidexterity. Our contribution is fourfold. 
First, our results reveal that a relationship must deviate from the attributes of an arm’s-length 
relationship in order to enhance its explorative and exploitative learning capabilities that 
ultimately lead to (contextual) ambidexterity. This finding provides empirical support for 
the main premise of the RBV as advocated by Dyer and Singh (1998). However, from a firm 
perspective Dyer and Singh only considered complementary resources and capabilities, 
and knowledge-sharing routines to be the drivers of partner-specific ACAP (1998: 665). 
From an interfirm perspective we also found evidence for the two other determinants 
of relational rents (viz. relation-specific assets, and effective governance) as drivers of 
interfirm ACAP. This finding has important theoretical implications. Transaction cost 
economics (TCE),  the predominant theory for explaining governance issues, claims that 
governance choice is exclusively based on transaction cost minimizing considerations. 
Furthermore, in TCE reasoning relation-specific assets are primarily portrayed as potential 
sources of opportunism. Our empirical results show that governance and relation-
specific assets not only affect transaction costs (Chapters 2  and 3), but also contribute to 
joint value creation.
Second. Complementarity or the degree to which firms are able to fill out or complete 
each other’s performance by supplying distinct capabilities, knowledge, and resources 
(Jap, 1999) is widely acknowledged as one of the main factors underlying interfirm 
success. From our analysis it becomes apparent that complementarity is directly related to 
potential and realized absorptive capacity, but once controlled for the other determinants 
of relational rents, the direct effects of complementarity drop considerably, and in a single 
case even reaches non-significance due to complete mediation. Hence, once controlled for 
the other determinants of relational rents, the complementarity construct (also) influences 
intermediate variables that in their turn (also) have direct effects on the potential and 
realized absorptive capacity of the relationship. So, from a managerial perspective, firms 
may select partners because they possess different and valuable capabilities, but once this 
complementarity does not trigger e.g. noteworthy investments in idiosyncratic resources, 
connectedness, and/or relational norms, the relationship will in the best case extract only 
a fraction of the interfirm learning potential  that complementarity offers. 
Our third contribution concerns the multidimensionality of the ACAP construct. Jansen 
et al. (2005) investigated the relationship between organizational antecedents and the 
ACAP dimensions from an intrafirm level perspective, and found that organizational 
mechanisms affect a unit’s potential and realized absorptive capacity in different ways. 
From an interfirm level perspective our empirical results confirm the importance and 
necessity of conceiving ACAP as a multidimensional construct. PACAP and RACAP are 
distinct constructs, and our estimates show that the drivers that affect PACAP are different 
from the drivers that affect RACAP (and vice versa) in terms of their effects (size) and 
significance. Accordingly, a firm that wants to develop or refine the explorative and/or 
exploitative capabilities of the relationship has to pull the right strings to accomplish this. 
To that purpose our study offers practical indicators to improve the explorative and/or 
exploitative capabilities of the relationship, but for the relationship partners separately, 
which brings us to our fourth and last contribution.
Although scholars widely recognize the value of gathering data from the perspective 
of both partners, and many acknowledge that the lack of dyadic responses leads to 
limitations in their research, most surveys in the field of interfirm relationships rely on 
data collected from only one partner’s viewpoint (e.g., Lambe et al., 2002; Ambrose et al., 
2010; Oosterhuis et al., 2013). Like Ambrose et al. (2010), our study reveals that significant 
differences exist between the way the buyer and supplier perceive the dimensions of the 
same relationship. Furthermore, our findings show that the effect drivers have on the 
relationship’s learning capabilities is different for the buyers’ and suppliers’ perspective. 
4.6.3 Discussion, limitations and future research
Several limitations of the present study need to be discussed. Some offer promising 
avenues for future research.
First. In the present study we empirically investigated the absorptive capacity of vertical 
interfirm relationships from a dyadic perspective. Accordingly, the buyer-supplier 
dyad was the object of our analysis, and we related the benefits of interfirm absorptive 
capacity directly to the explorative and exploitative learning performance of the dyad. 
Future research may encompass a broader network perspective to fully understand the 
value of a dyad’s absorptive capacity.  From a network perspective direct and indirect 
effects are taken into consideration. Direct effects (also called primary effects) relate to 
the realized benefits within the relationship, while indirect effects (also called secondary 
effects) capture the relationship’s value for connected relationships, and/or the value of 
the relationship for connected effects in the future (e.g., Walter, Ritter, and Gemünden, 
2001; Walter, Müller, Helfert, and Ritter, 2003). These indirect effects may explain why 
in our study the ‘supplier-only’ database shows significantly higher values for seven 
(out of nine) dimensions (see Table 4.4), while the ‘buyer-only’ data reveal higher path 
coefficients (see Table 4.5). Vandenbosch and Dawar (2002) argued that instead of merely 
focusing on product quality, suppliers differentiate themselves from competition through 
improved customer interactions. Accordingly, suppliers may invest more in a specific 
buyer-supplier relationship than the current status of the relationship warrants. Improved 
customer interactions may result in more specific customer knowledge, that may lead 
to superior future value creation.  Furthermore, improved customer interactions may 
generate valuable knowledge or assets that (also) can be used in other buyer-supplier 
relationships in which the focal supplier participates (see Walter et al., 2001). The buyer, 
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however,  may also derive indirect effects from a buyer-supplier relationship (Walter et al., 
2003), although ‘’above and beyond all other aspects’’ (Ulaga, 2003: 682) buyers will focus 
on the sourcing of products and services needed in their transformation process. 
Second. Although dyadic data are expected to approve the accuracy of the data and 
provide a more complete and balanced picture of the relationship, difficulties in gathering 
and using dyadic data have caused the majority of alliance scholars to rely on single-sided 
data (e.g., Lambe et al., 2002; Terpend, Tyler, Krause, and Handfield, 2008; Oosterhuis et 
al., 2013). Logistical challenges, informant anonymity, cost and time constraints, and low 
response rates are mentioned as reasons to rely on single-sided data. Accordingly, from 
a methodological point of view the limitation of a lack of dyadic response, which may be 
context specific, should be balanced against the difficulties of collecting and using dyadic 
data. Dyadic data are required where perceptions differ (Ambrose et al., 2010; Oosterhuis 
et al., 2013). Oosterhuis et al. (2013) found empirical support for their assertion that buyers 
and suppliers form similar perceptions of relationship attributes as long as these attributes 
are not related to the identity of their firms, and both partners have similar access to 
information related to these attributes. Accordingly, under these conditions they suggest 
to “Ask one of the parties (indifferent who)” (2013: 168) and thus to refrain from dyadic 
data collection. Our results challenge these findings. We found perceptual differences in 
relationship characteristics that do not involve the identity of the firms, and to which 
both partners have similar information access. Our findings, however, match Ambrose 
et al.’s conclusion that “relationship characteristics are socially constructed and that the 
differing perspectives of those characteristics by both partners in the dyad reflect real 
differences rather than measurement error.” (2010: 1283). Accordingly, one relationship 
partner speaking on behalf of the relationship, and addressing issues and conditions 
that reflect the characteristics of the relationship, may be perceptually biased from the 
viewpoint of the other partner. But if we allow for perceptual differences, also the extent to 
which perceptual differences exist and the interdependencies between these perceptions 
(Cook and Kenny, 2005) should be taken into account when investigating the learning 
performance of a relationship. Further research is needed to back up these assumptions.    
Third. To increase sampling variation and the validity of our results, we selected an 
industry cluster that includes firms with different knowledge strategies. Given the size of 
our sample, and particularly the size of its subsamples that refer to different industries, 
it was not possible to test whether our findings hold for each industry separately. 
To improve the validity of our findings, future research may investigate whether in 
each separate industry the same patterns are found. Apart from industry effects, the 
duration of the relationship and the importance of the purchased item may also have 
influenced our findings. In our data collection procedure we followed a 2x2 design, with 
relationship duration greater or less than two years on one dimension, and average or 
crucial importance of products or components on the other dimension (see section 
4.4.1).  Future research may also control for the potential effects of these two variables. 
 
The development of a finite mixture model (Wedel and Kamakura, 2000) may fit this 
purpose. Finite mixture models are used to determine homogeneous latent classes of 
firms, but require substantial large(r) sample sizes. 
Fourth. For the purpose of our study we modified scales (e.g., compatibility, and 
contracting) and generated new scales (for all ACAP dimensions). Although scrutinized 
conceptually and statistically, the development of these constructs is only an initial step. 
Further steps are needed. Future research should enhance the associated measures, and 
develop more elaborate constructs. As a noteworthy  example, we found nomological 
validity for the newly developed ACAP dimensions by relating the ACAP dimensions 
to ambidexterity. Both dimensions showed the expected positive effect. Ambidexterity, 
however, is a formative scale, where, for validation purposes, a reflective scale is preferred 
(Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer, 2001). Accordingly, in future research reflective 
performance measures are needed to validate and further develop the ACAP dimensions 
presented in our study.
Fifth, the interrelation between contracting and relational norms deserves more academic 
attention. In the alliance literature there is a discussion about whether both governance 
modes are substitutes, or complement each other. Wuyts and Geyskens focused on the 
formation phase of buyer-seller relationships, and concluded that “contracts are not 
compatible with direct social control and dyadic norms resulting from close partner 
selection” (2005: 113). Cannon et al. (2000) found that under conditions of high 
transactional uncertainty detailed contracts and cooperative norms complement each 
other, while under conditions of low transactional uncertainty “cooperative norms are 
redundant and plural form governance does not enhance (supplier) performance.” (2000: 
191). Poppo and Zenger (2002) observed increasingly customized contracts linked with 
higher levels of relational governance in the service industry. From the buyer perspective 
our study revealed a positive direct effect between contracting and relational norms on 
the one hand, and PACAP and RACAP on the other, which may support ‘the complement 
view’. From the supplier perspective we found a direct relation between relational norms 
and both ACAP dimensions, but not for contracting, which may support ‘the substitute 
view’. More systematic research is needed to investigate under which conditions contracts 
and relational norms act as substitutes, or as each other’s complements.    
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APPENDIX 4.1: MEASURES
Table 4.A1: Scales, indicators and sources.




We both contribute different resources to the relationship that help 
us achieve mutual goals.
We have complementary strengths that are useful to our relationship.
We each have separate abilities that, when combined together, 
enable us to achieve goals beyond our individual reach.
Jap (1999)





The organizational cultures of the two partners are compatible with 
each other.
The management and operating styles of the partners are compatible 
with each other.
In this relationship, a clear strategic fit between the partners’ 
objectives is evident.





In the relationship, there is ample opportunity for informal “hall 
talk” among employees. 
In the relationship, employees from different departments (partner’s 
departments included) feel comfortable calling each other when the 
need arises.
In this relationship, it is easy to talk with virtually anyone you need 
to, regardless of rank or position.
In the relationship, managers discourage employees from discussing 
work- related matters with those who are not their immediate 
superiors or subordinates.  (Rev C) (Rej)
People around here are quite accessible to each other.
Jaworski  and
Kohli (1993)






Both of us have created capabilities that are unique to this alliance.
Together we have developed a lot of knowledge that is tailored to 
our relationship.
Together we have invested a great deal in building up our joint 
business.
Both of us have made a great deal of investments in this relationship.
If this relationship were to end, we both would be wasting a lot of 
knowledge that is tailored to our relationship.
If either company were to switch to another partner, we both would 
lose a lot of investments made in the present relationship.





We do not have specific, well detailed formal agreements with our 
partner. (Rev C)
Rules and procedures take a central role in the relationship.
In the relationship, partners’ compliance to the formal contract is 
monitored extensively.
Written procedures regulate virtually all aspects regarding the 
parties’ tasks and influences in our joint operations. 
Formal agreements stipulate all aspects concerning the exchange of 
information between both partners. 













Flexibility in response to requests for changes is a characteristic of 
this relationship.
The parties expect to be able to make adjustments in the ongoing 
relationship to cope with changing circumstances.
When some unexpected situation arises, the parties would rather 
work out a new deal than hold each other to the original terms.






In this relationship, it is expected that any information that might 
help the other party will be provided to them.
Exchange of information in this relationship takes place frequently 
and informally, and not only according to a pre-specified agreement.
It is expected that the parties will provide proprietary information if 
it can help the other party.
It is expected that we keep each other informed about events or 
changes that may affect the other party





Problems that arise in the course of this relationship are treated by 
the parties as joint rather than individual responsibilities.
The parties are committed to improvements that may benefit the 
relationship as a whole, and not only the individual parties.
The parties in this relationship do not mind owing each other favors.







Joint creation of new manufacturing and production expertise?
Joint creation of new product development expertise?
Joint creation of new technological expertise?
Joint creation of new marketing expertise?
Joint creation of new managerial expertise? 
Lane et al. 
(2001)
Continuation of Table 4.A1
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The relationship with the other company has resulted in lower 
logistics costs.
Flexibility to handle unforeseen fluctuations in demand has been 
improved because of the relationship.
The relationship with the other company has resulted in better 
product quality.
Synergies in joint sales and marketing efforts have been achieved 
because of the relationship.
The relationship has a positive effect on our ability to develop 
successful new products.
The relationship helps us to detect changes in end-user needs and 
preferences before our competitors do.
Investments of resources in the relationship, such as time and 
money, have paid off very well.





In the relationship, data on the state-of-the-art of relevant external 
technologies are accessible when needed.
Relevant changes in the industrial environment catch us (the joint 
parties in the relationship) by surprise.  (Rev C) (Rej)
In the relationship, technological advancements that are critical to 
our operations are identified before they enter our markets.
In the relationship, our companies put a lot of effort into acquiring 
new external knowledge.
In the relationship, we have relevant, continuous and up-to-date 








In the relationship, we are not sufficiently capable of processing 
newly acquired information on new technologies and innovations, 
which are useful or have proven potential. (Rev C)
New developments are well understood due to the shared 
interpretation efforts of members of our companies. 
In the relationship, we quickly and professionally analyze and 
interpret changing market demands.
We effectively make use of our joint employees’ level of knowledge, 
experience and competencies to analyze and interpret external 
information.
The atmosphere in the relationship stimulates productive discussion 
encompassing a variety of opinions.  









In the relationship, we easily integrate newly acquired external 
knowledge into our common understanding of business-related 
affairs.  
For us it is not easy to see the connections among the pieces of 
external knowledge held by different members of our companies. 
(Rev C) (Rej)
In the relationship, an apparent incongruity between existing 
knowledge and newly acquired knowledge leads to ambiguity. (Rev 
C) (Rej)
In the relationship, we are able to transcend traditional mind-sets if 
newly acquired knowledge demands it. 
Employees of both partners get acquainted well enough to know 
who knows what.
Employees of both companies know where critical expertise resides 
within the relationship.
In the relationship, employees actively exchange newly acquired 
knowledge.
In the relationship, it is well known to which employee, or group of 
employees, specific new knowledge needs to be transferred.
Bontis et al. 
(2002)





In the relationship, both companies constantly discuss how to better 
exploit knowledge. 
Our customers can immediately benefit from new technological 
knowledge learned in the relationship.
New knowledge is easily integrated into our common operations.
The relationship’s capacity to use and exploit new knowledge allows 
us to respond quickly to changes in the environment. 
We are proficient in transforming new technological knowledge 
into product and process patents
Jansen et al. 
(2005)
 






Rev C = Reverse Coded
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APPENDIX 4.2: PLS-SEM ROBUSTNESS CHECK ‘HAYES AND   
PREACHER’(2010).
Sobel’s standard error for mediating effect (), as advocated by Hayes and Preacher (2010), 
was estimated importing the WarpPLS generated path coefficients and standard errorsin 
the equation
        
          (Equation A.1),
where  represents the estimated path coefficient i, and  the estimated standard error of 
From
                                              
           (Equation A.2)
the one-tailed p-value (was derived. Table 4.A2 summarizes the results.
Table 4.A2: Estimated mediation effects (PLS-SEM, Hayes and Preacher).
Dependent   Buyer Supplier
  mediation effect: Indirect effect: t-value:     p-value: Indirect effect: t-value:     p-value:
PACAP                  
  M compatibility .029 .998   .160 -.060 -2.042   .021**
  M connectedness .056 2.094   .019** .060 1.213   .114
  M idiosyncratic resources .087 2.021   .023** .084 1.074   .142
  M contracting   .019 .367   .357 -.002 -.185   .427
  M relational norms .094 2.809   .003*** .048 1.401   .082*
RACAP                  
  M compatibility .078 2.012   .023** -.037 -.501   .309
  M connectedness .066 2.147   .017** .090 1.492   .069*
  M idiosyncratic resources .060 1.508   .067* .113 1.498   .068*
  M contracting   .033 .426   .335 -.002 -.102   .460
  M relational norms .102 2.971   .002*** .067 1.645   .051*
Note: *** p ≤ .01;** p ≤ .05;* p ≤ .10.
From Table 4.A2 we can conclude that the results are almost identical to the indirect 
effect estimates of Table 4.7. There are two small differences. Instead of being significant 
at the .05-level (Table 4.7b), the ‘supplier only’ database shows significance at the 
.10-level (Table 4.A2) for the mediating effects of idiosyncratic resources and relational 
norms on the relationship between complementarity and RACAP.
130 | Chapter 4 Interfirm absorptive capacity: its dimensions, drivers, and impact on ambidexterity | 131
APPENDIX 4.2: PLS-SEM ROBUSTNESS CHECK ‘HAYES AND   
PREACHER’(2010).
Sobel’s standard error for mediating effect (), as advocated by Hayes and Preacher (2010), 
was estimated importing the WarpPLS generated path coefficients and standard errorsin 
the equation
        
          (Equation A.1),
where  represents the estimated path coefficient i, and  the estimated standard error of 
From
                                              
           (Equation A.2)
the one-tailed p-value (was derived. Table 4.A2 summarizes the results.
Table 4.A2: Estimated mediation effects (PLS-SEM, Hayes and Preacher).
Dependent   Buyer Supplier
  mediation effect: Indirect effect: t-value:     p-value: Indirect effect: t-value:     p-value:
PACAP                  
  M compatibility .029 .998   .160 -.060 -2.042   .021**
  M connectedness .056 2.094   .019** .060 1.213   .114
  M idiosyncratic resources .087 2.021   .023** .084 1.074   .142
  M contracting   .019 .367   .357 -.002 -.185   .427
  M relational norms .094 2.809   .003*** .048 1.401   .082*
RACAP                  
  M compatibility .078 2.012   .023** -.037 -.501   .309
  M connectedness .066 2.147   .017** .090 1.492   .069*
  M idiosyncratic resources .060 1.508   .067* .113 1.498   .068*
  M contracting   .033 .426   .335 -.002 -.102   .460
  M relational norms .102 2.971   .002*** .067 1.645   .051*
Note: *** p ≤ .01;** p ≤ .05;* p ≤ .10.
From Table 4.A2 we can conclude that the results are almost identical to the indirect 
effect estimates of Table 4.7. There are two small differences. Instead of being significant 
at the .05-level (Table 4.7b), the ‘supplier only’ database shows significance at the 
.10-level (Table 4.A2) for the mediating effects of idiosyncratic resources and relational 




Transaction cost economics (TCE) is a theory that has repeatedly been invoked in the 
description and explanation of make-or-buy decisions and the concomitant economic 
structures, of which the hybrid vertical interfirm relationship is an example. Following 
TCE reasoning, a hybrid vertical interfirm relationship – a governance structure 
somewhere between the extremes of market and hierarchy - will be implemented where 
an independent supplier firm, due to semi-transaction specific investments, can aggregate 
demand from various client firms. However, beyond a modest level of environmental 
uncertainty, and despite economies of scale or scope, semi-specific technologies will be 
standardized or vertically integrated because of the proposed superior transaction cost 
minimizing properties of the market and the hierarchy. Accordingly, instead of being a 
viable answer to environmental  uncertainty, TCE predicts hybrid vertical relationships to 
dissolve because of environmental uncertainty (Williamson, 1979; 1985; 1986). 
It is Williamson himself who granted that in response to a regime of rapid innovations 
new hybrid forms of organization may appear, and more study concerning the relations 
between organization and innovation is needed (1985). Furthermore he argued that the 
TCE framework cannot be expected to capture more than mean features and extending 
it to include additional or substitute dimensions may sometimes be necessary (1986). To 
better understand the governance of hybrid vertical interfirm relationships, we elaborated 
the conventional TCE framework (‘received TCE’) and extended it to include additional 
and substitute dimensions (viz. the temporal, the cognitive, and the social dimension of 
exchange). In three studies we empirically tested the suggested extensions of received TCE. 
The temporal dimension assumes a dynamic perspective, where a continuous process 
of decision-making is necessary to adapt to ever-changing circumstances. Accordingly, 
an exchange relationship develops gradually over time and different contingencies are 
likely to lead to different configurations of governance. We further maintained that true 
dynamics require that one breaks through the traditional assumption in mainstream 
(neoclassical) economics of given preferences, given technology, and given knowledge 
that are in principal available to all. Through interactions with partnering firms the 
state of knowledge and preferences may change. As a result, the value of exchange 
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